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NOTES
THE ELIMINATION OF RACISM FROM JURY
SELECTION: CHALLENGING THE
PEREMPTORY CHALLENGE
Since the adoption of the fourteenth amendment to the United
States Constitution, it has fallen largely upon the federal courts to
enforce its guarantees of due process and equal protection to all
persons regardless of race. Yet state and federal courts still employ
a procedure, the peremptory challenge, which permits litigants to
exclude citizens from participation in the justice system as jurors
based upon race, gender, or even more frivolous classifications.'
The contradictions presented by the peremptory challenge are
self-evident. How can a court dedicated to justice for all permit
discriminatory practices precisely designed to let private prejudices
affect the outcome of a trial?
In December of 1988, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit ordered the reexamination of the jury selection
procedures in the case of Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co. ("Edmon-
son I"), a civil suit in the United States District Court for the Western
District of Louisiana. 2 The court of appeals declared that the trial
had probably been tainted by racial discrimination in the course of
jury selections The court held that the defendant's use of peremp-
tory challenges to exclude potential jurors from the trial solely on
the basis of race would violate the constitutional guarantee of equal
protection. 4
For an example of one of the more absurd reasons cited for challenging a juror, see,
e.g., United States v. Romero-Reyna, 889 F.2d 559, 560 (5th Cir. 1989) (court upheld exclusion
of a pipeline worker, one of six Hispanic jurors challenged by prosecutor, based on prose-
cutor's explanation that he always challenged jurors whose occupation begins with the letter
P), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1818 (1990).
2 Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co. ("Edmonson I"), 860 F.2d 1308, 1315 (5th Cir.
1988), rev'd, 895 F.2d 218, 219 (5th Cir. 1990) ("Edmonton II"), cert. granted, 111 S. Ct. 41
(Oct. 1, 1990) (No. 89-7743).
Edmonson I, 860 F.2d at 1315.
Id.
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With this holding, the Edmonson I court extended to federal
civil trials the rule enunciated two years earlier by the United States
Supreme Court in Batson v, Kentucky. 5 In that case, the Supreme
Court stated that a prosecutor's racially discriminatory use of per-
emptory challenges violated the equal protection clause of the four-
teenth amendment. 6 The Edmonson I court was the first federal court
to apply the Batson rule to a civil trial in which neither party was a
governmental entity.'
The decision in Edmonson I raises a number of questions about
the nature and purpose of peremptory challenges,8 differing stan-
dards of fairness in civil and criminal trials, 9 and the extent to which
equal protection applies to private discrimination.° The Edmonson
I court's broad extension of the frontiers of the Batson principle"
• Id. at 1313; see Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 89 (1986).
OBatson, 476 U.S. at 89.
7 The previous federal cases were all civil rights suits brought against government agents
or entities. See Fludd v. Dykes, 863 F.2d 822, 823 (11th Cir. 1989) (defendant was county
sheriff), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 201 (1989); Wilson v. Cross, 845 F.2d 163, 164 (8th Cir. 1988)
(defendants were police officers); Maloney v. Washington, 690 F. Supp. 687, 687 (N.D. Ill.
1988) (defendants were mayor and police commissioner), vacated sub nom. Maloney v. Plun-
kett, 854 F.2d 152 (7th Cir. 1988); Clark v. City of Bridgeport, 645 F. Supp. 890, 890 (D.
Conn. 1986) (defendants were city and police officers); Esposito v. Buonome, 642 F. Supp.
760, 760 (D. Conn. 1986) (defendant was police officer). Edmonson was a personal injury suit
against a private employer for an on-the-job accident. Edmonson 1, 860 F.2d at 1309-10.
6 See Edmonson 1, 860 F.2d at 1313-14.
9 Id. at 1313.
10 Id. at 1311-13.
" The Batson opinion offered little guidance to lower courts seeking to apply its holding
to other facts. The Supreme Court expressed no view on such issues as the sixth amendment.
aspects of the case, the use of peremptories by defense counsel, and current jury screening
techniques in general. 476 U.S. at 84 n.4, 89 n.12. Further, the Court stated, "we make no
attempt to instruct these [state and federal trial) courts how best to implement our holding
today." Id. at 99 n.24.
Although in his brief in Edmonson 1 the plaintiff based his argument heavily on the
seventh amendment, the court concentrated only on equal protection issues, and did not
refer to the seventh amendment in its opinion. Supplemental/Reply Brief on Behalf of
Plaintiff-Appellant at 6, Edmonson I, (No. 87-4804).
This note focuses on the Edmonson courts' treatment of the fourteenth amendment issues
and on the presence of state action. It does not address sixth or seventh amendment issues.
The seventh amendment guarantees civil litigants a trial by an impartial jury. U.S. CONST.
amend. VII. The seventh amendment questions raised by these situations were never dis-
cussed by the courts involved. To the extent that sixth and seventh amendment analyses are
analogous, the Batson Court's decision to rule on fourteenth and not sixth amendment
grounds may explain in part why the seventh amendment issue has not really come up in
the civil cases. See infra notes 89-91 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Batson
Court's refusal to address the petitioner's sixth amendment claim in that case.
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sparked a strong dissent, followed by a grant of rehearing en banc
by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals."
On rehearing, decided March 1, 1990, the en banc court re-
versed- the decision of the panel and reinstated the verdict of the
district court.'s The Edmonson II court held that no state action is
present in a private party's use of peremptory challenges, and there-
fore the fifth and fourteenth amendments are inapplicable. 14 The
court also held that, in any event, such use of peremptories is
neither discriminatory nor unfair. 15 The court read Batson as apply-
ing only to the exercise of peremptories in the criminal trial of a
black defendant,' 6 and refused to extend that holding to the civil
arena.° The United States Supreme Court has since decided to
consider the case, granting Edmonson's petition for certiorari in
October of 1990. 18
Historically, the peremptory challenge is a jury selection pro-
cedure which essentially allows a civil or criminal litigant to exclude
a limited number of persons from the jury for no stated reason. i 9
The history of the peremptory challenge is long, and marked by
"very old credentials."2° In Roman law, each party to a case could
propose one hundred potential judices, from whom the other party
was allowed to strike half, leaving a final body of one hundred to
try the case." Some form of peremptory challenge has been in use
in the English system since the earliest days of jury trial; at common
law, criminal defendants were allowed to reject up to thirty-five
12 Edmonson I, 860 F.2d at 1315-17 (Gee, J., dissenting), reh'g cn banc granted, 860 F.2d
at 1317.
' 3 Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co. ("Edmonson II"), 895 F.2d 218, 219, 226 (5th Cir.
1990). The trial verdict was actually in favor of the plaintiff Edmonson, but the jury also
found that he was eighty percent contributorily negligent. Edmonson I, 860 F.2d at 1310.
14
 Edmonson II, 895 F.2d at 219. The equal protection and due process requirements of
the fourteenth amendment were made applicable to federal actions through the fifth amend-
ment's due process clause in Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 500 (1954).
' 5 Edmonson II, 895 F.2d at 219.
15 Id. at 223, 225.
" Id. at 226.
15 Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 111  S. Ct. 41 (Oct. 1, 1990) (No. 89-7743) (grant
of certiorari and leave to proceed in forma pauperis).
19 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1023 (5th ed. 1979).
20 Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 212 (1965). The Swain opinion contained a lengthy
review of the history of the peremptory challenge. Id. at 212-19.
2' Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 119 (1986) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (quoting J.
PETTINGAL, AN ENQUIRY INTO THE USE AND PRACTICE OF JURIES AMONG THE GREEKS AND
ROMANS 115, 135 (1769)). Judices is the plural of the Latin judex, meaning judge or juror.
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jurors, whereas the prosecutor could strike an unlimited number. 22
This unequal distribution caused delays and injustices, so in 1305,
an Ordinance was enacted requiring the prosecution to show cause
for challenging any juror. 23 By that time, however, the peremptory
challenge was so entrenched as an essential element of a jury trial
that the Ordinance was adapted into the "stand-aside" practice. 24
Under this system, the prosecution could ask objectionable jurors
to stand aside until selection was completed. If an insufficient num-
ber of jurors remained after challenges for cause and defendant's
peremptory challenges had been exercised, the prosecution would
then be compelled to show why the set-aside persons should still be
kept off the jury." Current English practice continues to employ
this system, with the exception that the defendant is now limited to
three peremptory strikes, and generally, litigants on either side
rarely use them.26
The English common law practice was carried over to the
American colonies and eventually into federal law. 27 An early Act
of Congress, for example, provided for thirty-five peremptories in
trials for treason, and twenty in trials for other capital felonies. 28 In
other criminal and civil trials, the parties exercised peremptory
challenges as a common law right. 29 Over the years, the number of
allowable strikes has changed," but the nature of the peremptory
challenge has remained largely the same as it was at common law--
an essentially arbitrary challenge to a certain number of jurors,
exercised without judicial interference, for which no cause need be
shown.3 '
The current federal law of jury selection is set out in Chapter
121 of Title 28 of the United States Code: sections 1861 and 1862
of that title state that all citizens from every segment of the com-
munity have both the right and the obligation to serve as jurors,
and that no one may be excluded from jury service on account of
22 Swain, 380 U.S. at 212-13.
" Id. at 213.
" Id.
25 Id.
to Id. at 213 n.12; Alschuler, The Supreme Court and the Jury: Voir Dire, Peremptory Chal-
lenges, and the Review of Jury Verdicts, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 153, 166 (1989).
27 Swain, 380 U.S. at 214.
22 Id.; 1 Stat. 119 (1790).
" Swain, 380 U.S. at 214 n.13.
" Id. at 214-15.
31 Id. at 212 n.9, 220.
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race, sex, religion, national origin or economic status." Section 1866
of Title 28 authorizes the exclusion of jurors through the use of
peremptory challenges, as provided by law." That law for civil trials
is set out in section 1870, which provides for a minimum of three
peremptory challenges for each side."
This note examines the application of the United States Con-
stitution's equal protection guarantees to the exercise of peremptory
challenges in federal civil trials. 35 Since Batson, a progression of
lower court cases have applied its rule to civil trials, culminating in
the Edmonson decisions. 36 In shifting from the criminal field, where
the state is prosecuting the case, to the civil realm, where the parties
are often private individuals or entities, the key issue becomes
whether the state action necessary to trigger fourteenth amendment
52 Section 1861 reads:
It is the policy of the United States that all litigants in'Federal courts entitled
to trial by jury shall have the right to grand and petit juries selected at rindom
from a fair cross section of the community in the district or division wherein
the court convenes. It is further the policy of the United States that all citizens
shall have the opportunity to be considered for service on grand and petit juries
in the district courts of the United States, and shall have an obligation to serve
as jurors when summoned for that purpose.
28 U.S.C. § 1861 (1988).
Section 1862 provides: "No citizen shall be excluded from service as a grand or petit
juror in the district courts of the United States or in the Court of International Trade on
account of race, color, religion, sex, national origin, or economic status." 28 U.S.C. § 1862
(1988).
5' 28 U.S.C. § 1866 (1988).
5' 28 U.S.C. § 1870 (1988). Section 1870 states: "In civil cases, each party shall be entitled
to three peremptory challenges. Several defendants or several plaintiffs may be considered
as a single party for the purposes of making challenges, or the court may allow additional
peremptory challenges and permit them to be exercised separately or jointly." Id,
Rule 47(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allows additional peremptories if the
court empanels alternate jurors—one extra strike for each two alternate jurors. FED. R. Cry.
P. 47(b).
For the rule on peremptory challenges in federal criminal trials, see FED. R. Cam, P.
24.
35
 Although this note concentrates only on federal cases, a number of state courts have
also addressed the issue of Batson and civil peremptories. For a discussion of the issue with
thorough documentation of relevant state decisions, see generally Patton, The Discriminatory
Use of Peremptory Challenges in Civil Litigation: Practice, Procedure and Review, 19 TEX. TECH L.
REV.' 921 (Spring 1988), and Note, The Civil Implications of Batson v. Kentucky and State v.
Gilmore, 40 RUTGERS L. REV. 891 (Spring 1988).
56 See Edmonson v, Leesville Concrete Co. ("Edmonson I"), 860 F.2d 1308, 1315 (5th Cir.
1988), rev'd, 895 F.2d 218, 219 (5th Cir. 1990) ("Edmonson II"), cert. granted, 111  S. Ct. 41
(Oct. 1, 1990) (No. 89-7743); Wilson v. Cross, 845 F.2d 163, 164-65 (8th Cir. 1988); Maloney
v. Washington, 690 F. Supp. 687, 688 (N.D. III. 1988), vacated sub nom, Maloney v. Plunkett,
854 F.2d 152 (7th Cir. 1988); Clark v. City of Bridgeport, 645 F. Supp. 890, 895 (D. Conn.
1986); Esposito v. Buonome, 642 F. Supp. 760, 761 (D. Conn. 1986). For a further discussion
of these cases, see infra notes 112-62 and accompanying text.
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protection is present." Thus, this note also reviews the federal case
law on the nature of state action in private discrimination."
Over time, the United States Supreme Court has developed
various theories and tests of state action, and has held impermissible
state action to exist in a variety of quasi-private situations, including
judicial enforcement of private discrimination, 39 significant state
involvement in discrimination,49 or discrimination conducted in co-
operation with, or with aid from, the state, or pursuant to a state-
created privilege. 4 ' This note examines how the Edmonson cases
brought together these two lines of cases—Batson and its progeny
and the private discrimination/state action cases—to resolve the pre-
viously unaddressed problem of racial peremptories by private
party civil litigants. 42
Section I of this note discusses the development of equal pro-
tection against racial discrimination in jury selection, from its origins
in the Reconstruction era through Batson and its civil law progeny.43
Section II examines the various theories of state action which have
grown out of private discrimination cases." Section III discusses
the decision of the Fifth Circuit panel in Edmonson I as it relates to
both the Batson rule and the state action problem. 45 Section III also
addresses the treatment of those same cases and issues, leading to
a different result, by the en banc court in Edmonson //.46 Section IV
analyzes the law regarding fourteenth amendment limits on the
exercise of peremptory challenges and discusses the developing
trend in that area. 47 Section V concludes that. equal protection of
the laws demands that peremptory challenges be used in a manner
completely free of racial and ethnic discrimination, if they are to
be permitted at all.
37 Edmonson 1, 860 F.2d at 1310.
38 See infra notes 182-244 and accompanying text.
'g Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 14, 20 (1948). For a discussion of this case, see infra
notes 183-92 and accompanying text.
1° Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369, 378-79 (1967); .see Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis,
407 U.S. 163, 173 (1972). For a further discussion of these cases, see infra notes 201-18 and
accompanying text.
" See Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 937 (1982). For a discussion of this
case, see infra notes 219-29 and accompanying text.
12 See infra notes 245-332 and accompanying text.
" See infra notes 48-181 and accompanying text.
84 See infra notes 182-244 and accompanying text.
83 See infra notes 245-65 and accompanying text.
46 See infra notes 266-332 and accompanying text.
47 See infra notes 333-439 and accompanying text.
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I. PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES AND EQUAL PROTECTION
In 1880, the United States Supreme Court laid the foundation
for enforcement of equal protection in jury selection in Strauder v.
West Virginia." In Strauder, the Court invalidated a West Virginia
statute completely barring blacks from service on juries. 49 Strauder
was a black man who had been indicted, tried and convicted for
murder by an all-white jury in a West Virginia county court," At
his trial, Strauder petitioned to remove the case to federal court, to
quash the venire and to arrest the judgment, and made several
other motions protesting the exclusion of blacks from the jury. 5 '
He claimed that the statute limiting jury service to white men vio-
lated the fourteenth amendment's equal protection clause because
it denied him the same privilege enjoyed by white defendants—to
be tried by a jury from which one's racial peers have not been
excluded. 52 The state courts denied all of Strauder's motions."
On writ of error, the United States Supreme Court reversed
the judgments of the West Virginia courts" and declared the jury
statute unconstitutional." Applying the newly enacted fourteenth
amendment with rigor, 56 the Court stated that West Virginia's dis-
crimination in the assembling of juries was precisely the type of act
the amendment was designed to prohibit. 57
 More specifically, the
Court declared that the sole purpose of the Reconstruction Amend-
ments was to protect the civil rights of blacks." In order to fulfill
48
 100 U.S. 303, 308 (1880). The Batson Court later remarked that Strauder "laid the
foundation for the Court's unceasing efforts to eradicate racial discrimination in the proce-
dures used to select the venire from which individual jurors are drawn." Batson v. Kentucky,
476 U.S. 79, 85 (1986).
Strauder, 100 U.S. at 310.
5° Id. at 304.
51 Id. at 304-05.
" Id. The West Virginia act in question stated: "All white male persons who are twenty-
one years of age and who are citizens of this State shall be liable to serve as jurors, except as
herein provided," Id. (quoting 1872-73 W. Va. Acts 102). The exceptions essentially applied
to state officials. Id. at 305.
w Id.
" Id. at 312,
55 Id. at 310.
56
 See id. at 307, 310. The Strauder Court stated, "As we have said more than once, [the
fourteenth amendment's) design was to protect an emancipated race, and to strike down all
possible legal discriminations against those who belong to it." Id. at 310 (emphasis added).
57
 Id. at 308. "And how can it be maintained," the Court emphasized, "that compelling
a colored man to submit to a trial for his life by a jury drawn from a panel from which the
State has expressly excluded every man of his race, because of color alone, however well
qualified in other respects, is not a denial to him of equal legal protection?" Id. at 309.
58 Id. at 306, 310 (citing The Slaughter-Mouse Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873)).
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that purpose, the Court reasoned, the amendment must be con-
strued liberally. 59 The Court, however, saw little need for much
liberal reading in this case, holding that the West Virginia act plainly
discriminated against blacks 6° by violating an ancient and essential
civil right—to be tried by a jury of one's peers. 6 '
With its broad mandate to eliminate racial discrimination in the
composition of juries, Strauder became the first in a long line of
cases upholding racial equality in procedures for the selection of
jury venires. 62
 The first United States Supreme Court case to discuss
the fourteenth amendment implications of peremptory challenges,
however, was Swain v. Alabama, decided in 1965. 63 In Swain, the
Court held that a prosecutor's use of peremptories to exclude all
blacks from the jury of a black defendant did not violate the defen-
dant's fourteenth amendment rights." Petitioner Swain, a black
man, had been tried, convicted and sentenced to death for rape by
an all-white jury in the Circuit Court of Talladega County, Ala-
bama. 65
 Citing Strauder, Swain challenged his conviction on the
ground that blacks had been unconstitutionally excluded from his
jury.66
 The petitioner's claim had three prongs: first, that blacks
59
 Strauder, 100 U.S. at 307.
69 Id. The Court asked:
What is this [the language of the fourteenth amendment] but declaring that the
law in the States shall be the same for the black as for the white; that all persons,
whether colored or white, shall stand equal before the laws of the States, and
in regard to the colored race, for whose protection the amendment was pri-
marily designed, that no discrimination shall be made against them by law
because of their color?
That the West Virginia statute respecting juries . . . is such a discrimination
ought not to be doubted.
Id. at 307-08.
61 Id. at 308-09. In his dissent in Swain v. Alabama, Justice Goldberg noted the impor-
tance which the Court at the time of Strauder apparently attached to jury rights. 380 U.S.
202, 230 (1965) (Goldberg, J., dissenting) (quoting Strauder, 100 U.S. at 308-09). This
importance may be demonstrated by comparing the decision in Strauder with the roughly
contemporaneous holdings in Plessy v. Ferguson, which established the doctrine of "separate
but equal" in public accommodations, and Pace v. Alabama, which upheld a state statute
prohibiting miscegenation. Swain, 380 U.S. at 231 (Goldberg, J., dissenting) (citing Plessy v.
Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) and Pace v. Alabama, 106 U.S. 583 (1882)).
62
 Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 85 (1986). The Court cited several cases in this line,
including: Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482 (1977); Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475
(1954); Avery v. Georgia, 345 U.S. 559 (1953); Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587 (1935); Neal
v. Delaware, 103 U.S. 370 (1881). Batson, 476 U.S. at 84 n.3.
69 380 U.S. 202, 211-22 (1965).
64 Id, at 222, 224.
65 Id. at 203.
66 Id.
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were grossly underrepresented on the venire for the trial;`'' second,
that the prosecutor, using peremptory strikes, had removed the six
remaining blacks from the venire;° and third, that not a single
black had served on a petit jury in the county since approximately
1950. 69
According to Justice White, writing for the Court,'" none of
these claims amounted to a violation of equal protection."' With
regard to the underrepresentation of blacks on the venire, the Court
ruled that jury lists or venires need not precisely reflect the pro-
portions of racial and ethnic groups in the general population, as
long as the process of drawing up the jury rolls was race-neutral or
non-discriminatory. 72 In Swain's case, the Supreme Court held that
the underrepresentation was not constitutionally significant, and
that the drawing up of the jury lists, albeit imperfect, was free from
actual discrimination."
On the second issue, the prosecutor's use of peremptory chal-
lenges, the Court held that the state's peremptories in any one case
were insulated from fourteenth amendment review by a presump-
tion that the prosecutor was using them solely to obtain a fair and
impartial jury for that trial."' The Court based this presumption on
67 Id. at 205-09,
68 Id. at 209-22.
w Id. at 222-28.
70 The Swain Court split 6-3, with justice Goldberg writing the dissent. Id. at 228. Oddly,
in his dissent in Batson, Chief justice Burger stated that the result in Swain had been reached
"without a single dissent. .. ." Batson, 476 U.S. at 112 (Burger, C.j., dissenting).
71 Swain, 380 U.S. at 209,222,224.
72 Id. at 208-09.
75 Id. at 209. The Court stated:
The overall percentage disparity has been small, and reflects no studied attempt
to include or exclude a specified number of Negroes. Undoubtedly the selection
of prospective jurors was somewhat haphazard and little effort was made to
ensure that all groups in the community were fully represented. But an imper-
fect system is not equivalent to purposeful discrimination based on race.
Id.
74 Id. at 222. Note, however, that the presumption was in theory not completely insur-
mountable; the Court stated:
If the State has not seen fit to leave a single Negro on any jury in a criminal
case, the presumption protecting the prosecutor may well be overcome, Such
proof might support a reasonable inference that Negroes are excluded from
juries Ibr reasons wholly unrelated to the outcome of the particular case on
trial and that the peremptory system is being used to deny the Negro the same
right and opportunity to participate in the administration of justice enjoyed by
the white population, These ends the peremptory challenge is not designed to
facilitate or justify.
Id, at 224.
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two factors: first, the historic purpose of the peremptory chal-
lenge—to ensure a jury free from bias and the appearance of bias; 75
and second, the nature of the peremptory itself, which by definition
is exercised with complete freedom, for no stated reason, and is not
subject to inquiry or review. 76
 Such a time-honored right, the Court
reasoned, could not be discarded solely on the basis of the exercise
of six strikes in one trial." An equal protection claim would only
be colorable, the Court held, if the defendant could show that the
prosecutor had used peremptories so as to pervert their purposes
by systematically excluding members of the defendant's race in
every case, for reasons completely unrelated to the outcome of any
trial, regardless of who the parties were and what circumstances
were involved. 78
 Although Swain had been able to show that not
one black had been seated on a trial jury in Talladega County since
1950,7° the Court held that this proof was insufficient to rebut the
presumption shielding the prosecutor's actions. 8° The claim fell
short, the Court held, because Swain was unable to prove that the
prosecutor alone was responsible for the exclusion of blacks from
the juries of any of the previous trials. 8 '
The Swain rule's "crippling" 82 burden of proof has been de-
scribed by one court as "Mission Impossible," 83 and it was this aspect
of the Swain decision which the United States Supreme Court ad-
dressed and overruled in the 1986 case of Batson v. Kentucky." The
Batson Court held that a black criminal defendant could make a
prima facie showing of unlawful discrimination based only on the
exclusion of black jurors from his or her own trial. 85
75 Id. at 211-12, 219.
78 Id. at 219-20. The Court explained, "'For it is, as Blackstone says, an arbitrary and
capricious right; and it must be exercised with full freedom or it fails of its full purpose.'"
Id. at 219 (quoting Lewis v. United States, 146 U.S. 370, 378 (1892)).
77 Id. at 221-22. The Court stated that "No subject the prosecutor's challenge in any
particular case to the demands and traditional standards of the Equal Protection Clause
would entail a radical change in the nature and operation of the challenge." Id.
" Id. at 223.
79 Id. at 226. According to Justice Goldberg's dissent, no black had served on a jury in
the county "within the memory of persons now living . . ." Id. at 231-32 (Goldberg, J.,
dissenting).
89 Id. at 224, 226.
8' Id. at 226-27.
82
 Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 92 (1986).
8' McCray v. Abrams, 750 F.2d 1113, 1120 (2d Cir. 1984), appeal vacated, 478 U.S. 1001
(1986). See infra note 91 for a discussion of McCray.
84 476 U.S. at 82, 100 n.25.
85 Id. at 96.
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Batson was a black man convicted in a Kentucky court for
burglary and receipt of stolen property. 86 At trial, the prosecution
used its peremptory challenges to strike all four blacks on the venire,
thus producing an all-white jury.87 Because the facts of the case
were similar to those in Swain, petitioner Batson conceded that
Swain was probably controlling on the equal protection question,
and so chose not to challenge Swain directly. 88
 Thus, Batson's ar-
gument was not based on equal protection at all, but rather on the
sixth amendment. Batson contended that the prosecutor's exclusion
of black jurors violated his right to trial by a jury drawn from a
cross-section of the community. 89 The Supreme Court, however, in
an opinion written by Justice Powell for a seven-member majority, 90
decided nonetheless to reconsider Swain and rule on the equal
protection issue, completely passing over the sixth amendment
claim. 9 I
86
 Id. at 82-83.
87 Id. at 83.
88 Id. at 83,84 n.4.
88 See id. at 84 n.4.
8°
 Justice White, who wrote the Swain decision, concurred in Batson. The continued
widespread use of peremptory challenges to exclude blacks, Justice White stated, persuaded
him that they should no longer be insulated from fourteenth amendment inquiry. Id. at 101
(White, J., concurring).
Note, however, that Justice White joined in the Court's opinion in Holland v. Illinois
that race-based peremptories do not violate the sixth amendment. 110 S. Ct. 803,806 (1990).
See infra note 91 for a further discussion of Holland.
81 Batson, 476 U.S. at 84 n.4. The Court stated that it was in agreement with counsel
for the respondent, Commonwealth of Kentucky, who argued that a reconsideration of Swain
and the fourteenth amendment issue was necessary to decide the case. Id. In his dissent,
Chief Justice Burger harshly criticized the Court for casting aside the age-old peremptory
challenge and the twenty-one year old Swain rule on the basis of an argument the petitioner
had expressly refused to advance. Id. at 112 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
The Court's insistence that this was exclusively a fourteenth, and not a sixth, amendment
issue is further illustrated by the fact that the Court, shortly after Batson, vacated the decision
of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in McCray v. Abrams, 750 F.2d
1113 (2d Cir. 1984), appeal vacated, 478 U.S. 1001 (1986). The Court of Appeals in McCray,
on facts similar to those in Batson, strongly criticized the Swain rule, and proceeded to hold
that the prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges to exclude Blacks and Hispanics for racial
reasons violated the sixth amendment right to trial by an impartial jury drawn from a fair
cross section of the community. Id. at 1131. Although this decision achieved the same result
as in Batson, the Supreme Court nevertheless vacated the judgment and instructed the Second
Circuit Court of Appeals to reconsider the case in light of the decision in Batson. McCray v.
Abrams, 478 U.S. at 1001.
The Court finally reached the sixth amendment issue in Holland v. Illinois, 110 S. Ct.
803 (1990). The sharply divided Court held that a prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges
to exclude the only two blacks on the venire did not violate a white defendant's sixth
amendment rights. 110 S. Ct. at 806. The sixth amendment's requirement of a representative
cross section of the community, the Court held, applies only to the group from which the
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The Batson Court reasoned that the peremptory challenge pro-
cedure was subject to equal protection because the fourteenth
amendment was meant to protect the rights of individuals through-
out the course of judicial proceedings. 92 After reaffirming the prin-
ciples established in Strauder, the Court concluded that racially based
peremptories presented wide-ranging equal protection problems."
The Court held that the state's exclusion of members of the defen-
dant's race from the jury violated the defendant's right to be tried
by a jury selected according to non-discriminatory criteria:94 More-
over, the procedure also violated the specific holding in Strauder
that a state may not exclude anyone from jury service on the basis
of race alone. 95
The Batson Court further stated that the practice also denied
the equal rights of the prospective jurors, because it implied that
they, because of their race, were either unqualified to serve as jurors
in general, or were unable to decide impartially a case involving a
member of their own race.96
 The Court also perceived that the
harmful effects of racial peremptories would extend to the entire
judicial system and to the community as a whole. 97 For the law to
tolerate discrimination in court procedures is impermissible, the
Court stated, because it damages public confidence and faith in the
ultimate fairness and justice of the very institutions established to
prevent and punish such discrimination. 98
 Further, the Court stated
jury is drawn, not to any particular jury itself. Id. at 807-09. The sixth amendment, the
Court stated, guarantees not a representative jury, but an impartial one. Id. at 807. The
Court added, however, that it was expressing no view on the fourteenth amendment issues
of the case, and even indicated that the prosecutor's actions in the Holland case may have
been unlawful under Batson. Id. at 810-11. Indeed, it appears that a majority of the Court
at that time still supported the Batson rule: in addition to the four dissenters, Blackmun,
Brennan, Marshall and Stevens, Justice Kennedy filed a concurring opinion in which he
stated that if Holland's claim were based on Batson and the fourteenth amendment, rather
than the sixth amendment, it would have merit. Id. at 811 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Also,
Justices O'Connor and White, who were members of the majority in Batson, remain on the
Court; Justice Brennan has since been replaced by Justice Souter.
For a discussion of the application of the sixth amendment/fair cross section analysis to
peremptory challenges, see. Patton, supra note 35, at 930-43, and Pizzi, Batson v. Kentucky:
Curing the Disease but Killing the Patient, 1987 Sup. CT. REV. 97.
92 Batson, 476 U.S. at 88-89.
23 Id. at 85-90.
" Id. at 85-86.
93 Id. at 86 (citing Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303,305 (1880)).
96 Id. at 86-87.
97 Id. at 87.
98 Id. at 87-88.
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that for the justice system to sanction such "pernicious" discrimi-
nation may legitimize and even stimulate racial bigotry."
The Batson Court noted that the Swain decision had attempted
to balance the rights of the accused against the prosecutor's historic
privilege to use peremptory challenges.'°° The Batson Court stated,
however, that the Constitution granted no right to peremptories.'°'
Therefore, the practice could not continue unfettered when incon-
sistent with the mandate of equal protection.'° 2
The Court then held that a defendant could establish a claim
of unlawful discrimination by proving a relatively simple prima facie
case.'" The defendant first must show that he or she is a member
of a cognizable racial or ethnic group. 1 °4
 Then the defendant must
show that the prosecutor has peremptorily removed from the venire
fellow members of the defendant's group.'°5 The defendant may
also introduce any other relevant circumstantial evidence, and may
rely on the fact that peremptory challenges, almost by definition,
permit discrimination by those who are so inclined.'" Together, the
Court held, these elements raise an inference that the state has
impermissibly excluded jurors solely on the basis of racei° 7
 Once
the defendant establishes the prima facie claim, the burden then
shifts to the prosecution to prove that there was no discrimination
by providing race-neutral reasons, rationally related to the outcome
of the trial, for striking each of the jurors in question. t°8
99 Id.
w° Id. at 91.
101 Id.
192 Id. at 98-99.
103
 Id. at 96.
1 °4 Id. For a discussion of the concept of a "cognizable group," see Patton, supra note
35, at 946-59.
100
 Batson, 476 U.S. at 96.
106 Id, at 96-97.
07 Id.
108 Id. at 97. For a discussion of the problem of rebutting the prima facie case, and the
general procedural aspects of the Batson rule, see Patton, supra note 35, at 965-80.
It may be useful at this time to note the case of King v. County of Nassau, 581 F. Supp.
493,494 (E.D.N.Y. 1984), an employment discrimination suit brought against a public college
two years before Batson. When the plaintiff protested the defendants' use of peremptory
challenges against the only two blacks in the jury pool, the district court ruled that Swain
applied in civil cases to both public and private litigants and therefore peremptories would
be upheld unless "the state, acting on a policy of white dominance, attempts to keep blacks
off all juries . . . ." King, 581 F. Supp. at 500 (emphasis in original). Further, the court
articulated reasons why equal protection should be applied with less rigor in the peremptory
challenge context: first, peremptories are not as stigmatizing as other forms of discrimination;
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Thus, the key aspects of the Batson rule can be restated in three
sentences. First, the state may not, even in individual trials, use
peremptory challenges to exclude jurors based solely on race.'°°
Second, such exclusions violate the fourteenth amendment rights
of the defendant, the jurors, and the community as a whole."°
Third, a claimant may make out a simple prima facie case of dis-
crimination and shift the burden to the prosecutor to demonstrate
that the challenges were racially neutral."'
Soon after the Supreme Court decided Batson, cases began to
arise in lower federal courts seeking to apply its rule to civil trials.
The first was Esposito v. Buonome, decided in August of 1986, just
three months after Batson." 2 In Esposito, the United States District
Court for the District of Connecticut held the Batson rule inapplic-
able to a claim by a white plaintiff in a civil trial seeking to overturn
the defendant's challenges. of the only two blacks on the venire." 3
In its brief opinion, the Esposito court did not state the facts and
nature of the lawsuit; the only fact relevant to the state action issue
specifically stated was that the two defendants were East Haven,
Connecticut, police officers, "Individually and in Their Official Ca-
pacities." 114
The court cited two primary reasons why Batson should not
apply to Esposito's civil suit." First, the Batson rule arose out of a
criminal case, and therefore reflected the special sensitivity which
second, a peremptory strike does not significantly harm the juror; and third, the harm to
the black litigant is not of the type the fourteenth amendment was meant to address. Id. at
502-03. It is doubtful that this decision would stand in light of Batson and the subsequent
decisions, and for that matter, it is questionable how the King court's third rationale would
stand up against Strauder. See generally Batson, 476 U.S. 79; see also Su-auder. v. West Virginia,
100 U.S. 303 (1880).
" Batson, 476 U.S. at 89.
" 0 Id. at 86-88.
i" Id. at 96-97.
112 Esposito v, Buonome, 642 F. Supp. 760, 761 (D. Conn. 1986). Note that Circuit
Judge Thomas J. Meskill, sitting by designation, wrote this ruling; Judge Meskill had dis-
sented in McCray. See McCray v. Abrams, 750 F.2d 1113, 1135 (Meskill, J., dissenting), appeal
vacated, 478 U.S. 1001 (1986). See supra note 91 for a discussion of McCray.
" 3 Esposito, 642 F. Supp. at 761.
514 Id. at 760.
15 Id. at 761. The court also briefly dismissed plaintiff's argument based on McCray v.
Abrams, 750 F.2d 1113 (2d Cir. 1984), noting that the Supreme Court had vacated that
decision. Esposito, 642 F. Supp. at 761. See supra note 91 for a discussion of McCray.
Plaintiff's statutory argument, based on 28 U.S.C. § 1862, which bars exclusion from
federal juries on the basis of race, was also unsuccessful. Esposito, 642 F. Supp. at 761. The
court cited 28 U.S.C. 1866, which permits exclusions by peremptory challenge. 642 F.
Supp. at 761-62. See supra notes 32-33 and accompanying text for a discussion of sections
1862 and 1866.
March 1991}	 PEREMPTORY CHALLENGE
	 447
courts must show toward the rights of a criminal defendant, a factor
not present in this civil case." 6 As a second and related point, the
Esposito court noted that the complaining party was the plaintiff,
the party who chose to initiate the legal action, rather than a defen-
dant brought to court against his or her will." 7
 The claimant's case
was further weakened, the court stated, by the fact that he was
unable to prove the prima facie elements set out in Batson, because
he was not a member of a cognizable racial group and not of the
same race as the excluded jurors.'"
The Esposito court's dismissal of the civil Batson claims was fol-
lowed only two months later in the same district by Clark v. City of
Bridgeport," 9 which adopted the Batson reasoning and held that the
defendant city attorney's use of peremptories to exclude all blacks
from the juries of three civil rights suits violated the equal protection
clause.' 20 The Clark opinion dealt with three suits, Clark v. City of
Bridgeport, Rizzoli v. Muniz, and Simmons v. Formichella, each of which
was a section 1983 civil rights action against the city of Bridgeport
and members of its police force.' 2 ' The court held jury selection
for all three trials on the same clay, and the same Assistant City
Attorney represented the defendants in all three cases.' 22 In each
case, the defendants used their peremptories to exclude any and
all blacks from the three juries. 12" Plaintiffs in each case moved to
strike the juries, citing Batson, and the court granted all three mo-
tions in one memorandum opinion.' 24
The Clark court reached its decision despite the fact that the
plaintiff in one of the suits was white.'" The court still overturned
the exclusion of the single black from the jury in that case, stating
that the racial exclusions from the other two juries made up a
"totality of circumstances" sufficient to raise an inference of discrim-
ination.'" The court also invoked its "supervisory power" to protect
the rights of the challenged juror, who, as the Supreme Court had
116 Esposito, 642 F. Supp. at 761.
117
	 The court did not elaborate as to why a civil plaintiff might be less entitled to
equal protection than a civil defendant. See id.
LIS Id .
119 645 F. Supp. 890 (D. Conn. 1986).
L20 Id. at 898.
191 Id. at 890-91.
122 Id. at 891.
129
 Id. at 891-92.
124 Id .
129 Id. at 892. (The title of that suit was Rizzoli v. Muniz.)
129 Clark, 645 F. Su pp. at 897.
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stated in Batson, was also denied equal protection by the exclusion.' 27
The Clark court took this action despite the fact that none of the
challenged jurors had requested the court to protect that right.' 28
The court also cited as a factor the city attorney's admission that
racial bias motivated his challenges.'" Because the discriminatory
actor in this case was the city attorney, the court found sufficient
state action to implicate the fourteenth amendment, and hence, the
Batson rule.'"
No federal appeals court had considered the civil application
of Batson until the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit decided Wilson v. Cross in April of 1988.' 3 ' In holding that
a white plaintiff could not make out a prima facie case of discrim-
ination under Batson, the Wilson court expressed strong doubts that
Batson applied to civil cases at all.' 32 Plaintiff Wilson, the owner of
a roller skating rink, had filed a section 1983 suit against the local
police for alleged harassment of his black patrons, thus harming
his business.'" Wilson lost at trial, won a partial reversal on an
unrelated appeal, then lost again on remand.'" This second appeal
focused on the defendants' striking of the only two blacks on the
venire.' 35
 The result was similar to that in Esposito.'" The court
expressed grave misgivings about whether the Batson rule could be
extended to limit the use of peremptory challenges in civil trials.'"
'" Id, at 894, 897. For a discussion of the court's supervisory power over peremptories,
see Patton, supra note 35, at 943-46.
128
 Id. at 897. Clark remains the only federal case in which a peremptory challenge was
disallowed in order to vindicate the rights of a juror alone. See id.
In Id. at 893. The court, with evident distaste, quoted at length from the city attorney's
rambling statement in response to plaintiffs' motion at trial challenging his use of peremp-
tories, in part:
Illf I had a choice between a white juror and a black juror under the facts of
these cases, I'm going to take a white juror. That's what I'm saying .... [W]hy
should I put my city and my defendants at the mercy of the people in my
opinion who make the most civil rights claims, at least in my experience ... .
But I've been honest with your Honor. I told you exactly why I kept those
people off the jury.
Id. at 894.
' 3° Id. at 895, 895 n.6. It is important to note, however, that the court restricted its rule
to situations where the party exercising the challenges is a governmental entity. Id. at 896.
131 845 F.2d 163, 164 (8th Cir. 1988).
192 Id. at 164-65. The appeal also addressed another unrelated issue. Id. at 165.
' 5 Id. at 164.
Id. The first appeal, Wilson v. City of North Little Rock, 801 F.2d 316 (8th Cir. 1986),
dealt with unrelated issues.
"5 Wilson, 845 F.2d at 164.
"6 The Wilson court cited Esposito in a footnote. Id. at 164 n.2.
197 Id. at 164-65 (dicta). The court did not actually rule on the applicability of Batson,
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Even assuming that Batson applied, the court reasoned that the
plaintiff had failed to establish his prima facie case because he was
white, and therefore not a member of the same cognizable racial
group as the challenged black jurors.' 38
In the 1988 case of Maloney v. Washington, 139 the United States
District Court for the Northern District of Illinois addressed the
racially motivated exercise of peremptory challenges by both black
and white litigants on both sides of the dispute.'" The district court
ruled that the constitutional mandate expressed in Batson applied
to civil litigants as well, and imposed sanctions on both parties for
their racial use of peremptories. 14 '
In Maloney, four white Chicago police officers brought a civil
rights action against the estate of the late Mayor Harold Washington
and several members of his adtninistration. 142 The officers claimed
that the defendants had demoted them for racial and political rea-
sons.' 43 When the case first went to trial, the plaintiffs used all their
peremptory challenges on black venire-persons, while defendants
used all of their strikes against whites.'" Later, the court declared
a mistrial for reasons unrelated to the jury selection.' 45
Before the retrial began, the court admonished counsel for
both parties and warned that it would apply the Batson rule during
the selection of the new jury. The court would therefore require
each side to justify its use of peremptories against members of the
opposite race. 146 The court took this action on its own initiative,
dispensing with the need for a prima facie case set out in Batson. 147
because the claimant was unable to present a prima facie case. Id, at 165. Another panel of
the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has reiterated its "grave doubts" about the extension of
Batson in Swapshire v. Baer, 865 F.2d 948, 953-54 (8th Cir. 1989). One year later, however,
in Reynolds v. City of Little Rock, yet another Eighth Circuit panel held Batson applicable to
civil trials. 893 F.2d 1004, 1009 (8th Cir. 1990). See infra note 321 and accompanying text
for a discussion of the Reynolds case.
136 Wilson, 845 F.2d at 165.
139 690 F. Supp. 687 (N.D. ill. 1988), vacated sub nom. Maloney v. Plunkett, 854 F.2d 152
(7th Cir. 1988). The district court's opinion will hereinafter be referred to as Maloney; the
appeals court decision will be referred to as Maloney II.
1 " Maloney, 690 F. Supp. at 688. The court devoted most of its attention, however, to
plaintiffs' use of their peremptories. See id. at 688-89.
14 ' Id. at 689, 692.
143 Id. at 687-88.
143 Id. at 688.
' 44 Id.
143 Id. The mistrial arose out of certain testimony by one of the co-defendants, police
superintendent Fred Rice. The court did not elaborate on this point. Id,
146 Id.
141 Id. The court stated: "[We refused to empanel the nine venire members because we
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The litigants, however, were not deterred; plaintiffs once again
struck three of four blacks, and defendants struck only whites.' 48
The court refused to empanel the jury and ruled that in this case
the statutory right to peremptory challenges must bow to the con-
stitutional mandate of Balson. 149 The Maloney court concluded that
Batson applied to peremptories by civil litigants, regardless of
whether the litigants are state actors or not.' 50 The court stated that
a private party may not use a court's power to contravene the equal
protection clause. 15 ' Further, the Maloney court emphatically reiter-
ated its refusal to tolerate discrimination in a United States court-
room.' 52
 In the end, the court ordered that in the selection of the
third jury for this case, neither party would be allowed any per-
emptory challenges.'"
Both parties, however, responded by filing for a writ of man-
damus to compel the judge to proceed to trial with the jury they
had selected.' 54 In Maloney v. Plunkett ("Maloney II"), the United
States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit granted mandamus
and vacated the district court's order that a new jury be selected
without any peremptories allowed. 155
 The appeals court took the
unusual step of granting mandamus on interlocutory appeal for
concluded that the jury selection process had been tainted by the plaintiffs' use of their
peremptory challenges to exclude members of the black race," Id.
"5
 Id. at 688-89.
"9 Id. at 689.
'" Id.
151 Id. at 690 (citing Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922 (1982)). See infra notes
219-29 and accompanying text for a further discussion of Lugar.
114
 Maloney, 690 F. Supp. at 690. The court declared: "Discrimination in the selection
of jurors in a United States District Court is anathema to a court sworn to uphold the
Constitution." Further, it continued:
We will not permit our power under Article III of the Constitution to be used
to sanction such discriminatory conduct. As one court recently stated. "[The
appearance of justice is not fulfilled if the trial court acquiesces in, condones or
fails to preclude attempts by the prosecuting attorney to exclude blacks from
the jury solely because they are black. The trial court cannot sit idly by in such
instances and become an accomplice to racial discrimination in the courtroom.
Rather, it must insure that justice prevails and that the appearance of justice is
demonstrated in the trial that is taking place before those in attendance."
Id. (quoting People v. Andrews, 172 III. App. 3d 394, 402, 526 N.E.2d 628, 634 (1988)).
155 Id. at 688, 692. Cf. Batson v. Kentucky, 976 U.S. 79, 102-03 (1986) (Marshall, J.,
concurring), in which Justice Marshall writes that the only sure way to eradicate racial
discrimination from jury selection is to eliminate peremptory challenges entirely..
154
 Maloney v. Plunkett ("Maloney IT'), 854 F.2d 152, 155 (7th Cir. 1988). The district
court, in its opinion issuing the original order, predicted this development. Maloney, 690 F.
Supp. at 688.
155 Maloney II, 854 F.2d at 155-56.
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two main reasons. First, the trial judge's order plainly violated Title
28, section 1870 of the United States Code, which provides for a
minimum of three peremptory challenges for each side in a civil
trial.'" This action, according to the court of appeals, was entirely
without precedent, and the district judge was unable to provide any
reason to justify it beyond his anger at the parties for their refusal
to cooperate.' 57
Second, the court of appeals stated, the trial judge's action
would cause unnecessary and costly delays in the resolution of this
suit.' 58 If the order were allowed to stand, the trial court would
have to repeat the jury selection process and the party who lost at
trial would have a "sure-fire" appeal, necessitating yet another re-
trial, before yet another jury.' 59 The court concluded that the dis-
trict judge should have allowed the trial to proceed and let the
losing party raise the Batson issue on appeal if it so desired.'" In its
brief opinion, the court of appeals was careful to express no opinion
on the merits of the application of Batson to civil trials,' 6 ' The
appeals court only criticized the trial court for the sanction it chose
to impose and the timing of its action, but not necessarily for its
substantive argument. 162
Fludd v. Dykes, decided by the United States Court of Appeals
for the Eleventh Circuit in January of 1989, was another civil rights
suit brought by a black plaintiff against local police officials.'" In
this case, the court held that the trial court had violated the black
plaintiff's fifth and fourteenth amendment rights by allowing a trial
from which blacks had been excluded peremptorily without a race-
neutral explanation.'" The plaintiff, Willie Fludd, had been shot
156 Id. at 154, 156. See supra note 34 and accompanying text for a discussion of section
1870.
152 Maloney II, 854 F.2d at 154.
156 Id. at 155-56.
159 Id. at 155.
169 Id. at 155-56.
161 /d. - The court stated:
Allowing Judge Plunkett's order to stand might be misunderstood by other
district judges as an expression of this court's view that Batson does apply in all
cases, a question we leave open; we express no view on that question, or on
whether there might be legal grounds other than equal protection for restricting
the use of peremptory challenges notwithstanding section 1870.
Id. at 155 (emphasis in original).
162 Id. at 155-56.
163 863 F.2d 822, 823 (11th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 201 (1989).
154 Id., 863 F.2d at 828. For a brief review of the Fludd decision, see Recent Cases, Equal
Protection—Jury Selection—Eleventh Circuit Restricts the Discriminatory Use of Peremptory Challenges
in Civil Litigation, 103 HARI/. L. REv. 586 (Dec. 1989).
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by a deputy sheriff during the arrest of an unnamed third party.
Fludd then sued the deputy as well as the sheriff, Dykes, for civil
rights violations under section 1983.' 66 When the jury was selected
for trial, defendants peremptorily struck the two blacks on the
venire. 166 Fludd, citing Batson, moved to require defendants to ex-
plain and justify the challenges. The trial court denied the mo-
tion.' 67
 On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that
Batson was applicable to the defendants.'" To permit such an ex-
ercise by either the government or a private party, the Fludd court
reasoned, would unconstitutionally harm the black litigant's chances
of being tried by a jury which included his racial peers.'" The court
further held that the act which violated Fludd's rights was the
judge's decision to deny Fludd's claim and proceed to trial with a
jury chosen pursuant to racial criteria. 170 The constitutional harm
is the same, the court declared, whether the discrimination occurs
in a civil or criminal tria1. 17 '
The Fludd court devoted a section of its opinion to the question
of whether there was sufficient state action behind the exercise of
the peremptories to implicate the fourteenth amendment.' 72
 The
court did not, however, rely on the defendants' status as government
officials to find the requisite state action.'" Rather, the court de-
clared that the discriminatory actor is the trial court which empa-
nelled the jury. 174
 Indeed, the court stated that a decision by a state
entity to discriminate in the course of jury selection is harmless until
the trial court overrules an objection to the discrimination. Accord-
ing to the Fludd court, by overruling such an objection and pro-
ceeding to trial, the judge himself or herself violates the equal
protection clause.'" In its reasoning, the Fludd court did not discuss
' 65 Id. at 824. The court did not state to what extent, if any, Fludd was connected to the
arrest, or how he came to be shot. See id.
166 Id.
167 Id.
166 Id. at 829.
' 69
 Id.
' 717 Id. at 828.
"I Id. at 829.
172
 Id. at 828.
173 See id. The court stated: "Thus, until the trial judge overrules a party's objection to
the racial composition of the venire, the law treats any previous decision on the part of a







any modern equal protection holdings, but instead cited post-Re-
construction jury discrimination cases such as Strauder. 176
Two of the earlier peremptory challenge cases briefly addressed
the state action issue as well. The district court in Clark v. City of
Bridgeport ruled that Batson applied to civil cases when there is state
action behind the peremptory challenges.'" The Clark court found
that the city attorney, as a government employee acting in his official
capacity, was a discriminatory state actor for fourteenth amendment
purposes. 178 In Maloney v. Washington, however, the district court
found peremptories impermissible whether the party exercising
them was a state agent or not. ' 79 The fourteenth amendment is
violated, the Maloney I court stated, when a private party uses a
court to sanction his or her discriminatory acts.'" The Edmonson
case, however, required the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals to ex-
plore the parameters of the state action concept in depth.' 81
II. STATE ACTION AND EQUAL PROTECTION
The United States Supreme Court has written that the task of
formulating a workable definition of state action in private discrim-
ination under the fourteenth amendment is a practically impossible
one; only by examining the facts and circumstances of each case
can courts accurately discern state involvement in private discrimi-
nation. 182
The first Supreme Court case to hold that private discrimina-
tion could amount to an equal protection violation was Shelley v.
Kraemer.' 83 Shelley dealt with the fourteenth amendment implica-
tions of actions by judges and court officers. 184
 The Shelleys were a
17° Id. (quoting Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 312 (1880)); see Note, The
Application of Batson v. Kentucky in a Civil Trial Selling, 42 BAYLOR L. Rev. 173, 193-94
(Winter 1990) (criticizing the Fludd court's reliance on these older cases).
1 " 645 F. Supp. 890, 895 (D. Conn. 1986).
178 Id. at 895 n.6.
179 Maloney v. Washington, 690 F. Supp. 687, 689 (N.D. III. 1988), vacated sub nom.
Maloney v. Plunkett ("Maloney II"), 854 F.2d 152 (7th Cir. 1988).
'" Id. at 690, Note that Maloney II did not consider the correctness of this ruling, but
rather the sanction the trial court applied. Maloney 11, 854 F.2d at 155.
181
	 v. Leesville Concrete Co, ("Edmonson I"), 860 F.2d 1308, 1310-11 (5th
Cir. 1988), rev'd, 895 F.2d 218, 219 (5th Cir. 1990) ("Edmonson II"), cert. granted, 111  S. Ct.
41 (Oct. 1, 1990) (No. 89-7743).
102
 Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715;722 (1961) (quoting Kutch v.
Pilot Cornm'rs, 330 U.S. 552, 556 (1947)).
1 " 334 U.S. 1, 20 (1948).
184 Id. at 4, 8.
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black family who purchased a home in 1945 in a mostly white
neighborhood in St. Louis, Missouri. A group of neighbors sued to
block the sale to Shelley and enforce a restrictive covenant placed
on Shelley's deed in 1911 banning the sale or lease of the property
to blacks or Asians.'"
The Supreme Court held that such private restrictive covenants
did not, in and of themselves, violate the equal protection clause.'"
When, however, a state court enforces such a covenant, the court
becomes a state actor denying equal protection of the laws to the
objecting party. 187
 Writing for the six-member majority,'" Chief
Justice Vinson stated that the principle had been long established
that courts and court officers acting in their official capacities are
state actors for fourteenth amendment purposes.'" The Court cited
some of the early jury discrimination cases, including Strauder, for
the proposition that discrimination, whether enacted by statute or
committed by a judicial officer, violated equal protection.' 90 Judicial
enforcement of the discriminatory covenants, the Court held,
clearly fell in this category of state action,' 91
 and, therefore, the
action clearly violated the plaintiff's constitutional rights to property
and equal protection of the laws.' 92
Whereas Shelley involved a court or judicial officer as the state
actor, the 1961 case of Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority' 93 arose
from the actions of a private party contracting with a state agency.'"
In Burton, the Supreme Court upheld an equal protection claim by
a black man challenging racial discrimination in a privately operated
restaurant located in a publicly owned and operated parking.facil-
ity.' 95
 The Wilmington Parking Authority (the "Authority"), a state
283
 Id. at 4-6.
296 Id. at 13.
297 Id. at 20.
298
 The decision was actually unanimous, as Justices Reed, Jackson and Rutledge did
not participate in the case. Id. at 23.
299 Id. at 14. The Court in Shelley catalogued a number of cases in which a court was
found to be a "state actor." Id. at 15-18.
' 9° Id. at 16. The Strauder Court, in addition to holding the discriminatory statute
unconstitutional, also stated that "(alny state action" which denies equal rights is unconsti-
tutional, and held that the trial court was in error for conducting the trial with the all-white
jury. Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 308, 310, 312 (1880).
292 Shelley, 334 U.S. at 19.
292 Id. at 20.
293
 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
Id. at 716.
j95 Id. at 716-17.
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agency which operated a public parking garage in Wilmington,
Delaware, leased some retail space in the garage to a private restau-
rant operator. This coffee shop refused to serve the plaintiff, Bur-
ton, because he was black. t96
The Supreme Court held that by failing to ensure that the
restaurant operator, as its lessee and contractor, conformed to the
fourteenth amendment mandates of equality, the Authority had not
only sanctioned the discrimination but had become a party to it as
well.' 97
 Thus, the Court reasoned, the Authority itself had violated
the equal protection mandates.' 98 Although the Court limited its
holding to the specific facts of the case, 199 the case remains a strong
statement of the state's responsibility to ensure adherence to the
Constitution even in its most remotely "public" activities. 200
Addressing another facet of state action in 1965, the Supreme
Court stated in Reitman v. Mulkeym that otherwise neutral state
statutes or constitutional provisions would not be insulated from
equal protection review when they served to facilitate private dis-
crimination. 202 The Reitman decision invalidated an amendment to
the California constitution, enacted by initiative in 1964, which
guaranteed the right of property owners to refuse to sell or rent
their real property to anyone they choose. 203 Such a provision, the
' 26
 Id. at 716.
157 Id. at 725. The Court declared:
INlo state may effectively abdicate its responsibilities by either ignoring them
or by merely failing to discharge them whatever the motive may be ... By its
inaction, the Authority, and through it the State, has not only made itself a
party to the refusal of service, but has elected to place its power, property and
prestige behind the admitted discrimination.
Id.
122 Id. at 724-25.
122 Id. at 726.
°° See, e.g., Edrnonson v. Leesville Concrete Co. ("Edmonson 1"), 860 F.2d 1308, 1312
(5th Cir. 1988), rev'd, 895 F.2d 218, 219 (5th Cir. 1990) ("Ellmonson II"), cert. granted, 111 S.
Ct. 41 (Oct. 1, 1990) (No. 89-7743).
"' 387 U.S. 369 (1967).
222 Id. at 380.
2" Id. at 371 (quoting CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 26, the amendment invalidated in this case).
The challenged provision was sweeping:
Neither the State nor any subdivision or agency thereof shall deny, limit or
abridge, directly or indirectly, the right of any person, who is willing or desires
to sell, lease or rent any part or all of his real property, to decline to sell, lease
or rent such property to such person or persons as he, in his absolute discretion,
chooses.
Id. at 371 n.2 (quoting CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 26).
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Court reasoned, would unconstitutionally involve the state in, and
place the state's sanction on, private discrimination in housing. 204
The Reitman Court emphasized the need to assess the impact
of a state action in order to determine whether the state, in an
apparently neutral action, had, in fact, "significantly involved itself"
in private discrimination.'" The California amendment, the Court
held, would have the effect of authorizing widespread discrimina-
tion in housing, and was therefore invalid. 2"
Seven years later, in Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 207 the Supreme
Court borrowed the phrase "significant involvement" from Reitman
and adopted it as its test for the presence of state action in private
discrimination. 2" The Court held that the state's issuance of a liquor
license to the defendant Moose Lodge was not sufficiently significant
state action to trigger the fourteenth amendment. 209 Similar to Bur-
ton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, the Moose Lodge case arose when
a bar denied service to the respondent, Irvis, a black man. 21 ° Irvis
sued under section 1983, claiming that the Lodge was a state actor
because the state of Pennsylvania had granted it a license to sell
liquor. 2 "
The Supreme Court rejected Irvis' argument. 212 The state li-
quor regulations, the Court wrote, could in no way be construed to
aid or encourage discrimination, or to make the state a participant
in the Lodge's actions. 215 The Court took pains to distinguish Bur-
ton, 214 where the Wilmington Parking Authority, as lessor to and
contractor with the restaurant, had a much closer relationship with
Id. at 378-79. In supporting its opinion, the Court reviewed a number of cases,
including Burton, which struck down various state statutes, regulations or policies which
authorized private discrimination. Id. at 378-80. Interestingly, the Court assiduously avoided
mention of Shelley, which also dealt with private housing discrimination, except to note in a
footnote that the trial court had relied heavily on Shelley in its decision. Id. at 373 n.4. In his
concurrence, Justice Douglas discussed Shelley at length. Id. at 381 (Douglas, J., concurring).
205 Id. at 380.
2°6
 Id. at 381.
2°' 407 U.S. 163 (1972).
2°8 Id. at 173.
209 Id. at 173-77. In his original brief to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, Edmonson
argued that state action may arise from state licensing of attorneys. Brief for Appellant at
12, Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co. ("Edmonson 1"), 860 F.2d 1308 (5th Cir. 1988) (No.
87-4804).
210 Moose Lodge, 407 U.S. at 164-65.
211





214 Id. at 172-75.
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the defendant than that present in Moose Lodge. 215 The Court in
Moose Lodge did, however, find potentially significant state involve-
ment on an ancillary issue. 216 The state liquor regulations required
private clubs like the Lodge strictly to adhere to their own by-laws.
The Court reasoned that, because the Moose Lodge had discrimi-
natory membership rules, for the state to require their enforcement
would violate the fourteenth amendment. 217 The distinction be-
tween the two claims, the Court explained, is whether the chal-
lenged state action serves to foster or encourage discrimination.
Whereas issuance of a liquor license in no way promotes discrimi-
nation, for the state to require enforcement of the Lodge's racist
by-laws plainly sanctions such discrimination. 218
In 1981, the Supreme Court formulated a new two-part test
for state action in Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co.. 219 In Lugar, the Court
held that a private party creditor's joint participation with govern-
mental officials in state-created attachment proceedings made the
creditor a state actor under the fourteenth amendment and section
1983.220 This case arose from the defendant Edmondson Oil's suc-
cessful ex parte petition to garnish and attach Lugar's property pend-
ing a judgment in a state court debt action.22 ' Lugar claimed the
procedures authorizing the attachment without prior notice and
hearing deprived him of his property without due process of law,
thereby calling into question the constitutionality of the attachment
statute on its face. 222
Drawing from a series of earlier debt-collection cases, the Su-
preme Court set out a two-part test to determine whether there was
state action sufficient to implicate the fourteenth amendment. 225
First, the violation must be the result of the exercise of some priv-
ilege created and granted by the state. 224 Second, the party charged
must be fairly cognizable as a state actor. 225 The Court listed three
standards by which a party may be characterized as a state actor:
215 Id. at 175.
216 Id. at 177. The Court described this aspect of its holding as an "exception" to its
general rule. Id.
217 Id. at 177-78.
21B at 176-79.
2" 457 U.S. 922,937 (1982),
220 Id. at 941.
221
 Id. at 924-25.
222 Id. at 925.
223 Id. at 937,939.
224 Id.
220 Id.
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one who is a governmental official; one who has acted together with
or received significant help from state officials; or one whose con-
duct is otherwise attributable to the state. 226
To illustrate its test, the Court then applied it to the Moose Lodge
case.227 The Lugar Court concluded that Irvis' claim against the
Lodge failed because it did not satisfy the first part of the test—
exercise of a state created privilege—because the Lodge's decision
to discriminate was in no way attributable to a governmental deci-
sion or action. 228 Applying the test to the instant case, the Lugar
Court held that in initiating the statutory debt collection proceed-
ings, the creditor was doing exactly what the law intended, and was
thus acting under color of state law. Therefore, its participation in
the attachment procedures made it a state actor. 229
In a 1988 case, Tulsa Professional Collection Services v. Pope, the
Supreme Court offered yet another version of the proper state
action criterion. 230
 The Court held in this case that when a creditor's
claim is denied without notice in violation of due process, the pro-
bate court's pervasive involvement in the administration of an estate
constitutes state action."' The plaintiff, a collection agency, had
filed a claim against a portion of Pope's estate, but the Oklahoma
probate court ruled that a two-month statute of limitations had
foreclosed the claim. 282
 In holding that the time bar placed on the
claim without sufficient notice was a denial of due process under.
the fourteenth amendment,233 the Supreme Court stated that pri-
vate use of state-sanctioned remedies or procedures does not nec-
essarily rise to the level of state action. 234 The Court added, however,
that overt, substantial assistance to private parties by state officials
in the course of state procedures may constitute state action. 235
Thus, the Court concluded, a private party's use of the probate
proceedings to foreclose Tulsa's claim, without first providing ade-
quate notice, constituted state action, because governmental officials
226 Id. at 937.
227 Id. at 937-38.
228 Id. at 938.
229
 Id. at 941-42.
230 485 U.S. 478,487 (1988).
43"
232
 Id. at 482.
"3 Id. at 491.
434 Id. at 485.
735
 Id. at 486.
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were "intimately" involved and provided obvious and significant
assistance. 286
In summary, the United States Supreme Court has developed
a variety of holdings and theories on the state action question,
varying with the facts of the cases before it."' The Shelley Court
held state action to exist in judicial enforcement of private discrim-
ination. 2" Burton held that a state's failure to prevent discrimination
by those with whom it dealt closely amounted to an equal protection
violation, 2" Reitman and Moose Lodge produced the test of significant
state involvement in private discrimination, 2" Moose Lodge adding
the distinction that the state action must work to foster or encourage
discrimination. 241 In Lugar, the Court developed the two-part in-
quiry into state-created privilege and status as a state actor. 242 The
holding in Tulsa Professional Collection Services turned on the pres-
ence of overt, substantial assistance by public officials. 243 It then fell
to the Edmonson court to synthesize these theories and formulae
into a workable standard applicable to the peremptory challenge.244
236 Id. at 487.
237 See supra note 182 and accompanying text on the fact-specific nature of the state
action holdings.
233 See supra notes 183-92 and accompanying text for a discussion of Shelley v. Kraemer.
239 See supra notes 193-200 and accompanying text for a discussion of Burton.
440 See supra notes 201-18 and accompanying text for discussions of Reitman and Moose
Lodge.
241 Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163,176-79 (1972).
242 See supra notes 219-29 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Lugar case.
243 See supra notes 230-36 and accompanying text for a discussion of Tulsa.
244 At this time it may be useful to take note of one other frequently cited Supreme
Court decision touching on the state action issue. In Blum v. Yaretsky, plaintiffs were nursing
home patients whose medicaid benefits were under threat of termination, without notice or
hearing, by a committee of private physicians and nursing home administrators acting pur-
suant to state and federal guidelines. 457 U.S. 991, 993-95 (1982). In holding that the
committee's decisions did not constitute state action, the Court stated that the acts of a
business subject to government regulations are not necessarily actions of the state. Id. at
1004. Rather, the Court held, there must be such a close nexus between the private action
and the state that the state may be deemed responsible for it. Id. The Court further indicated
that the state may be held responsible "only when it has exercised coercive power or has
provided such significant encouragement, either overt or covert, that the choice must in law
be deemed to be that of the state." Mere approval or acquiescence is not enough. Id. at 1004-
05. The Court limited its own holding, however, distinguishing it from other state action
cases such as Moose Lodge, stating that "[t]his case is obviously different from those cases in
which the defendant is a private party and the question is whether his conduct has sufficiently
received the imprimatur of the State so as to make it 'state' action . . . ." Id. at 1003.
See also Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974) (action of electric utility
to terminate plaintiff's service not state action even though approved by state public utilities
commission).
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III. PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES AND STATE ACTION: EDMONSON
V. LEESVILLE CONCRETE CO.
A. Edmonson I
In Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co. ("Edmonson I"), a three-
judge panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit directly confronted the issues of discrimination in jury se-
lection and fourteenth amendment state action, just eight months
after Tulsa and almost simultaneously with Fludd. 245
 Edmonson I was
the first post-Batson civil case which did not involve a state entity as
one of the parties, and thus required a more searching inquiry to
find the state action necessary to implicate the fourteenth amend-
ment.246 The Edmonson I court, in an opinion written by Circuit
Judge Alvin Rubin, held that a private litigant's racially motivated
peremptory challenges, because they were assisted by the court's
administration of jury selection, violated equal protection of the
laws guaranteed by the fifth and fourteenth amendments. 247
Edmonson I was a personal injury lawsuit brought against an
employer by a black worker injured in an accident on the job. 248 At
jury selection, the defendant peremptorily struck two of the three
blacks in the jury pool, prompting the first Batson-based motion
against a private litigant. 249 The Fifth Circuit panel held that the
civil setting provided no basis for limiting a litigant's equal right to
a fair tria1. 250
 To confine Batson to criminal cases, the court reasoned,
would be inconsistent with the basic principles of that case, namely,
245 Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co. ("Edmonson 1"), 860 F.2d 1308, 1310 (5th Cir.
1988), reed, 895 F.2d 218, 219 (5th Cir. 1990) ("Edmonson II"), cert. granted, 111 S. Ct, 41
(Oct. 1, 1990) (No. 89-7743). Edmonson I was decided on December 5, 1988, with rehearing
ordered on January 23, 1989; Fludd was decided on January 17, 1989.
245 See supra note 7 and accompanying text for a summary of the parties involved in
the other civil cases.
247 Edmonson I, 860 F.2d at 1314, 1315. Because this is a federal case, the fourteenth
amendment does not apply. See Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 500 (1954), which incor-
porated equal protection into the fifth amendment's due process clause, so that the same
standards of equality that apply to the states would apply to the federal government as well.
See id, at 499-500. Also, the Court in Thiel v. Southern Pacific Co. stated that the federal
right to an impartial jury applied in civil as well as criminal trials. 328 U.S. 217, 220 (1946).
248
 Edmonson I, 860 F.2d at 1309-10. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 supplied the basis for federal
jurisdiction. The injury occurred on a job site at Fort Polk, Louisiana, a federal enclave
(defendant company was a government contractor). Id. at 1310 n.2.
245 Id. at 1310. In contrast to the Edmonsan case, the court's action against both parties
in Maloney was apparently taken on its own initiative. See supra note 147 and accompanying
text on the sua sponte nature of the Maloney court's action.
455 Edmonson I, 860 F.2d at 1313-14.
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that the use or toleration of race-based peremptory challenges by
the state violates equal protection. 25 ' The court also cited Palmore v.
Sidoti, a 1984 United States Supreme Court case which invalidated
a Florida state court decision denying a white woman custody of
her child because she was living with a black man, to support the
principle that the state cannot give effect to private prejudices. 252
The Edmonson I court spent considerable effort in its handling
of the state action issue, namely, identifying the governmental action
which denied the claimant equal protection in a case involving two
private parties.'" In addressing this question, the court thoroughly
reviewed the state action cases, and then simply stated that the case
involved more governmental action than was deemed sufficient to
establish state action in Shelley, Lugar, Tulsa and Burton. 254
 Further,
the Edmonson I court stated, the government is "intimately involved"
in the entire jury selection process, including peremptory chal-
lenges, because the government summons the jurors, administers
the jury selection process, including voir dire and peremptories,
excuses the challenged jurors and empanels the jury. 255 Moreover,
the peremptory challenges are exercised pursuant to a federal stat-
ute, used in the course of a judicial proceeding, in a facility operated
by the government, and are presided over and given effect by a
judge who is obviously a governmental officia1. 256
 The state actor,
the court held, was the trial court and the judge—the agency and
officer who administer the peremptory challenge procedure and
give it the sanction and approval of the government institution
dedicated to justice. 257
The court's reasoning and conclusions in Edmonson I provoked
a sharp dissent. 258
 Circuit Judge Thomas Gee's dissenting opinion
called the court's holding "unfortunate" and "misguided." 259 He
2" Id. at 1314.
252 Id. (citing Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 431, 433 (1984)).
255
	 at 1310. The court obviously concentrated its efforts on the state action question;
in treating the Batson issue, it merely reviewed, without comment, the decisions in Wilson,
Esposito, and Clark, and only cited Maloney in a footnote. Id. at 1314, 1314 n.31.
254 Id. at 1312.
255 Id.
256
	 The court concluded: ''The government is inevitably and inextricably involved as
an actor in the process by which a federal judge, robed in black, seated in a panelled




	 at 1315 (Gee, J., dissenting).
259 Id.
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criticized both Batson and Edmonson I for undermining the venerable
institution of the peremptory challenge, and generally for having
"leapt halfway across a logical chasm and come to rest in midair." 26°
He asserted that the Batson and Edmonson I decisions had made this
leap by attempting to place limits on peremptory challenges, which
are by definition intended to be used for any reason, good, bad or
indifferent. 26 ' Judge Gee applied the two-part state action test from
Lugar,262 and argued that the second part of the test had not been
satisfied: a private litigant exercising peremptory challenges could
not reasonably be considered a state actor.263 Further, the dissent
reasoned, the court could not be considered the state actor, because
the function it performs is "merely ministerial." 264 The dissent was
not in vain; less than a month after the decision was issued, the
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals granted rehearing of the case en
ba nc . 265
• B. Edmonson II
When the en banc court issued its new decision in March of
1990, both Judge Gee and Judge Rubin again authored the opin-
ions; this time, however, Judge Gee wrote for the court and Judge
Rubin dissented. 266 The Edmonson II court restored the trial verdict
and held that the Supreme Court's rule in Batson v. Kentucky could
not be extended to compel private litigants in a federal civil trial to
explain their use of peremptory challenges. 267 The Edmonson
court based its decision on two factors: first, that no state action was
involved; and second, that a challenge based on the suspicion that
a juror may tend to favor a litigant of the same race harms neither
the juror nor the integrity of the judicial system. 268
Judge Gee first discussed the history of the peremptory chal-
lenge, relying almost completely on Justice White's opinion in Swain
wp Id. at 1315-16 (Gee, 1. ' dissenting).
261 Id. at 1316-17 (Gee, J., dissenting).
262 Id. at 1315 (Gee, J., dissenting). See supra notes 219-29 and accompanying text for
a discussion of Lugar.
265 Edmonson I, 860 F.2d at 1315-16 (Gee, J., dissenting).
26* Id. at 1316 (Gee, J., dissenting).
282 Id. at 1317.
288 Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co. ("Edmonson II"), 895 F.2d 218, 218 (5th Cir.
1990), cert. granted, 111 S. Ct. 41 (Oct. 1, 1990) (No. 89-7743).
227 Id. at 218-19.
286 Id. at 219.
March 19911	 PEREMPTORY CHALLENGE	 463
v. Alabama. 269 Judge Gee summarized the state of the law of per-
emptory challenges after Swain: litigants could freely exercise per-
emptories for any reason or no reason, but when a prosecutor uses
his strikes systematically to exclude blacks from all juries because of
race, there may be a violation of the equal protection clause. 270 The
Edmonson II court then turned to the Batson. decision, characterizing
it as a reaffirmation of the Swain holding."' According to the Ed-
monson II court, Batson only lightened the excessive evidentiary bur-
den prescribed by Swain for black criminal defendants to prove
unlawful discrimination. 272
Judge Gee then restated the narrower issue which the Edmonson
H court needed to address: whether a private litigant's use of per-
emptory challenges is state action to which constitutional restrictions
apply. 273 To determine the presence of state action, the court em-
ployed the two-part test devised by the United States Supreme
Court in Lugar v. Edmondson 0i1. 274 The first part of the Lugar test
is whether the alleged violation resulted from the exercise of a state-
created right or privilege. 275 Peremptory challenges amply satisfy
this requirement, Judge Gee held. 276 But, the court concluded,
Edmonson's claim fell short on the second half of the Lugar test,
namely, whether the person charged may fairly be characterized as
a state actor. 277 The only two potential state actors present in the
Edmonson case were the trial judge and the defense attorney who
actually exercised the strikes, and the Edmonson II court discussed
each of them in turn. 278
Judge Gee dismissed the argument that the trial judge was the
state actor, noting that the idea was inconsistent with the very nature
of peremptories, which by definition are not subject to the court's
262 Id. at 219-20. See supra notes 63-81 and accompanying text for a discussion of
Justice White's opinion in Swain. In discussing the history of the peremptory, Judge Gee




272 Id. at 220-21.
27s
	 at 221.
2" Id.; Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 937, 939 (1981). See supra notes
219-29 and accompanying text for a discussion of Lugar. Note also that this echoes Judge
Gee's argument in his Edmonson I dissent. Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co. ("Edmonson
I"), 860 F.2d 1308, 1315 (1988) (Gee, J., dissenting). .
2" Edmonson 11, 895 F,2d at 221; Lugar, 457 U.S. at 937, 939.
276 Edmonson 11,895 F.2d at 221.
277 Id.; Lugar, 457 U.S. at 937, 939.
276 Edmonson II, 895 F.2d at 221-22.
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control. 279
 Reiterating the arguments he advanced in his Edmonson
I dissent, Judge Gee stated that the court's function in overseeing
peremptory challenges was "merely ministerial" and constitutionally
insignificant. 280
 The court simply stands aside while the litigants
exclude various jurors for whatever reasons. 28 ' According to Judge
Gee, to raise such a minor procedural action, and consequently
everything a judge does in managing a trial, to constitutional sig-
nificance was a job for the Supreme Court, not the Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals. 282
The other possible state actor in the Edmonson case was the
defense attorney who exercised the strikes, but the Edmonson II
court found it inconceivable that a private party's private counsel
could ever be considered a state actor. 283 The court relied on the
1981 United States Supreme Court decision in Polk County v. Dodson,
which held that a government-paid public defender was not a state
actor and therefore not liable to her client under section 1983. 284
An attorney for a private party serves that party's interests alone,
and not those of the state, the Edmonson II court reasoned.285 Fur-
ther, if any state interest is present in civil litigation, the court held,
it is significantly lower than in a criminal case; thus, private counsel
in a civil trial cannot be said to be advancing any real governmental
in terest. 288
Holding no state actor present, the court then turned to issues
of logic and policy. 287 The court emphasized the overriding goal
that trials should be fair, both in reality and in the perception of
the participants and the community. 288 The court repeated that this
has been the historic purpose and effect of the peremptory chal-
lenge, by which litigants can disqualify any jurors they suspect may
be biased, for any reason. 289 Because the challenge has been appar-
ently successful in this respect for centuries, the court refused to
229 Id. at 221.
28° Id.
"' Id. at 222.
"2 Id.
288 Id.
2" Id.; Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312 (1981).
295
	 II, 895 F.2d at 222.
I" Id. Note that two judges concurred in this first part of the opinion only. Id. at 226
(Politz, J., concurring).
"' Id. at 222. Because the determination as to state action was dispositive of the case,
this discussion was largely gratuitous.
288 Id.
289 Id. at 223.
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tamper with it now, particularly by destroying its most fundamental
aspect and requiring an explanation for its use. 29°
Further, given the lack of any real state action or interest in a
civil trial, the court reiterated, it would be unwise to extend the very
narrow rule of Batson, which only changed the evidentiary burden
placed on a criminal defendant in Swain, to the civil sphere. 29 ' The
Swain decision, Judge Gee wrote in Edmonson II, could not support
the plaintiff's argument here that a private litigant must give rea-
sons for any strikes exercised against black venire-persons. 292 The
Edmonson II court reasoned that the line of cases beginning with
Strauder established that the United States Constitution prohibits
the exclusion of blacks from criminal juries on racial grounds, be-
cause such exclusions demean the black jurors. 293 But civil peremp-
tories exercised because an attorney fears a juror may tend to favor
a party of the same race are very plainly not demeaning, the court
concluded. 294
The Strauder—Swain—Batson reasoning does not apply in civil
cases, the Edmonson II court held, citing three distinctions: first, the
lack of state action which could be seen as official discrimination;
second, the diminished importance of the jury in civil trials because
the stakes are lower; and third, the partisan role of the civil advo-
cate, as opposed to that of the prosecutor, whose objective is justice
and truth. 295 The court asserted that the state cannot be held in any
way responsible for the actions of a civil advocate, however "obtuse"
they may be.296 Finally, the court noted that peremptory challenges
act as a social leveller. Because jurors of all races and classes are
subject to possibly unfair exclusion by peremptory challenge, the
challenge ultimately ensures equal treatment for al1. 297 Thus, the
Edmonson II court concluded, regardless of what the Supreme Court
256 Id.
'9 ' Id. See infra notes 418-20 and accompanying text for an analysis of Judge Gee's
narrow reading of Batson.
262 Edmonson II, 895 F.2d at 224. Note how the court relies on Swain, rather than Batson.
252 Id. at 224.
294 Id.
252 M. at 225-26. The court explained:
For the prosecutor's aim is justice. He wins when justice is done and—although
it is surely not the outcome he envisions—when it becomes apparent during the
trial of a criminal case, a la the celebrated fictional career of Perry Mason, that
the accused is innocent of the crime of which he stands charged, the prosecutor
has not "lost."
Id.
296 Id. at 226.
257 Id.
466	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 32:433
may say about peremptory challenges in criminal trials, the Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals would not place limits on them in the civil
context.298
Judge Rubin, in essence writing in defense of his decision in
Edmonson I, submitted a long, spirited and extensively documented
dissent, in which he was joined by Judge Wisdom, his colleague on
the Edmonson I pane1. 299
 Judge Rubin stated that nothing in the
language or spirit of the fourteenth amendment justified limiting
its protections to criminal trials. 3°0
, First, application of the Batson rule to civil trials would not
cause procedural difficulties because only when a claimant could
prove Batson's prima facie elements would an attorney be required
to explain his or her peremptories, in a simple, easily administered
procedure. 30 ' The dissent then considered the question of whether
state action was present in the defense's use of peremptory chal-
lenges, discussing a number of the state action cases cited in the
Edmonson I decision, particularly Lugar. 302 Judge Rubin acknowl-
edged that action pursuant to some statute with nothing more did
not itself satisfy the second prong of the Lugar test. 3°3
 The "some-
thing more" needed to constitute state action depends on the cir-
cumstances of the case, and in this case, Judge Rubin reasoned that
the active role of the trial judge in supervising jury selection pro-
vided that something.s04
 Judge Rubin further likened the racially
based peremptories in this case to the discrimination by a govern-
ment lessee in Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority,305 held uncon-
stitutional because the state government lent its "power, property
and prestige" to ostensibly private discrimination. 306
 Moreover, like
the provision struck down in Reitman v. Mulkey for granting state
authorization to housing discrimination, 307
 the law permitting per-
s°' Id.
2" Id. at 227-38 (Rubin, J., dissenting). Judge Rubin's opinion contained 123 footnotes.
3" Id. at 227 (Rubin, J., dissenting).
20 ' See, e.g., Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 98-99 (1986).
"2
 Edmonson II, 895 F.2d at 229-33 (Rubin, J., dissenting); Edmonson 1, 860 F.2d at
1311-12.
sos Edmonson II, 895 F.2d at 229 (Rubin, J., dissenting).
3" Id. at 232-33 (Rubin, J., dissenting).
3" 365 U.S. 715 (1961). See supra notes 193-200 and accompanying text for a discussion
of the Burton case.
Edmonson II, 895 F.2d at 230 (Rubin, J., dissenting) (citing Burton, 365 U.S. at 725).
"' Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369, 381 (1967). See supra notes 201-06 and accom-
panying text for a discussion of Reitman.
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emptory challenges gives parties complete discretion to discriminate
against whomever they please."
In addition, the Edmonson II dissent distinguished the cases
relied on by the majority, 3 D9 particularly Polk County v. Dodson.")
Polk County, Judge Rubin contended, did not address the issue of
fourteenth amendment state action. 3 " That a public defender does
not act under color of state law for purposes of a malpractice action
under section 1983 does not mean that a litigant cannot be a state
actor when exercising peremptory strikes through an extensive
state-created and administered procedure.312 The trial court, Judge
Rubin insisted, plays a central, active role in the jury selection
process; a role mandated in part by the federal policy of eliminating
discrimination from the jury system. 3 " Two authorities, according
to the dissent, determine the number and manner of peremptory
challenges in a federal trial: the federal statute and the discretion
of the trial judge. 314
 Judge Rubin argued that it is the judge who
gives effect to the challenges; peremptories have no effect unless
and until the court excuses the challenged juror.313 The intimate
involvement of the judge presiding over jury selection satisfies the
second part of the Lugar test, the dissent concluded."" This discrim-
ination was particularly disturbing to Judge Rubin because the law
has given this role to the judge precisely to prevent infection of the
system by private prejudices of all types. 317
308 Edmonton II, 895 F.2d at 230 (Rubin, J., dissenting).
359 The court also mentions two other cases in a footnote: Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S.
991 (1982) and Evans v. Abney, 396 U.S. 435 (1970). Edmonson II, 895 F.2d at 221 n.8.
Neither case, according to the dissent, was on point. Id. at 230 (Rubin, J., dissenting). See
supra note 244 for a discussion of the Blum case. The Evans decision upheld a Georgia court's
invalidation of a racially restrictive trust, and so did not face the issue of state action
promoting private discrimination. Evans, 396 U.S. at 439; Edmonson II, 895 F.2d at 230
(Rubin, J., dissenting).
"0 Edmonton II, 895 F.2d at 230-31 (Rubin, J., dissenting); Polk County v. Dodson, 454
U.S. 312 (1981).
3 " Edmonson II, 895 F.2d at 231 (Rubin, J., dissenting).
s)s
818 Id. at 231-32 (Rubin, J., dissenting).
314 Id. at 232 (Rubin, J., dissenting). See supra notes 32-34 and accompanying text for
a discussion of the statutes authorizing peremptory challenges in federal trials.
31s
	 II, 895 F.2d at 233 (Rubin, J., dissenting).
316 Id.
3" Id. The dissent stated: By carrying out his duties in a way that permits peremptory
challenges based on race, the rust of the judge's approval of discrimination rubs off onto
society, corroding the national character by giving private prejudice the imprimatur of state
approval." Id.
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Although there are certainly substantive differences between
criminal and civil trials, Judge Rubin repeated his opening assertion
that nothing in the fourteenth amendment justifies limiting it, or
Batson, to the criminal sphere. 318 The Batson case, he reasoned,
should not be read so narrowly as only to apply to evidentiary
burdens on black criminal defendants. Rather, Batson was the latest
progression in the effort begun in Strauder to eradicate discrimi-
nation from the jury system.318
Judge Rubin found support for the extension of this effort to
the civil arena in Fludd v. Dykes 320 and a recent Eighth Circuit Court
of Appeals decision, Reynolds v. City of Little Rock, which forbade a
city attorney's exclusion of two black jurors in a civil rights case over
the police shooting of a black man. 32 ' But Judge Rubin found the
strongest support for his argument in Batson itself, which stated
that discrimination in jury selection harms not only the black de-
fendant but also the excluded jurors and the entire community as
wel1. 322 If the harm is not limited to the criminal defendant, Judge
Rubin reasoned, nor should the remedy be so limited. 323 The rights
of citizens summoned for jury service should not be different de-
pending on the type of trial they sit on, the dissent argued. 324
Further, Judge Rubin asserted that the seventh amendment indi-
cates that the government interest in fair civil litigation is much
" 9 fd.
s" Id. at 233-35 (Rubin, J., dissenting).
32° Id. at 234 (Rubin, J., dissenting). See supra notes 163-76 and accompanying text for
a discussion of Fludd.
'' 893 F.2d 1004 (8th Cir. 1990). Decided in January of 1990, the Reynolds case was
brought on behalf of the estate of a mentally disturbed black man who was fatally shot by
eight Little Rock police officers after he waved a pocket knife at one of them. 893 F.2d at
1005. At trial, the city attorney peremptorily struck the only two blacks on the venire; when
plaintiffs moved for an explanation, the city attorney refused. Id. at 1006, 1008. The trial
court upheld the defendant's actions, but the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed,
holding that under Batson, a government litigant must give racially neutral reasons for the
strikes, if the plaintiff can establish a prima facie case of discrimination. Id. at 1009. The
Batson decision, the Eighth Circuit reasoned, was based on the fourteenth amendment, not
the sixth, and therefore was not restricted to criminal cases. Id. at 1008. Any other differences
between criminal and civil trials were immaterial for equal protection purposes, while the
community had a strong interest in assuring that no one is excluded from the justice system
and that all trials are free from even the appearance of discrimination. Id. at 1009. The
Reynolds court expressly declined to address the question of peremptories by private litigants.
fd.
522 Edmonson II, 895 F.2d at 235 (Rubin, J., dissenting); Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S.
79, 87 (1986).
323 See Edmonson II, 895 F.2d at 236 (Rubin, J., dissenting).
s" Id.
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stronger than the Edmonson II majority would acknowledge. 525 Civil
trials make up a majority of the activity of the federal judiciary,
Judge Rubin noted, and the government itself is often directly or
indirectly involved; as such, the government interest cannot be
minimized. 326 Moreover, the dissent continued, when the govern-
ment is a litigant, the court would be unable to sustain the civil-
criminal distinction set up by the majority without expressly per-
mitting discrimination by an agency of the state. 527
Judge Rubin concluded his dissent with a ringing declaration
that neither the history nor usefulness of peremptory challenges
can justify the evil of denying citizens the right to participate in the
justice system solely because of their race. 528 When a citizen alleges
discrimination in the courtroom, he declared, it is the court's solemn
duty to eliminate it; a person's rights with respect to the court system
should never be dependent upon his or her race." 9
Judge Rubin's dissent notwithstanding, the Edmonson II decision
firmly established the rule on peremptory challenges in the Fifth
Circuit. 33° The Batson rule requiring explanations of race-based
challenges is strictly limited to prosecutors in criminal trials."' The
exercise of peremptories in any manner by civil litigants does not
525 Id.
"6 Id. at 236-37 (Rubin, J. dissenting).
327 Id, at 237 (Rubin, J., dissenting).
328 Id. at 238 (Rubin, J., dissenting).
329 Id. at 237-38 (Rubin, J., dissenting). judge Rubin concluded:
We must take another step toward the goal of eradicating racial prejudice by
eliminating the shameful practice of permitting a federal statute to be employed
in a trial in a federal courtroom as a weapon of discrimination. I regret that
the majority cannot yet see that to permit a person to be rejected from a jury
solely because of the color of his skin rejects the promise upon which this
nation's independence was based and the guarantee that the Fourteenth
Amendment provides: that all persons are created equal. In God's sight. In
human right. And in regard to service on a federal jury.
Id.
3" Since Edmonson II, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals has again considered the issue
of race-based peremptories in civil trials, and has reiterated its Edmonson If holding. Polk v.
Dixie Insurance Co., decided in April of 1990, one month after Edmonton If, was an action
against an auto insurer by a black policy holder brought in the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Mississippi. 897 F.2d 1346, 1347 (5th Cir. 1990). When the
defendant insurance company used two peremptory challenges to strike the only two Blacks
in the venire, plaintiff, relying on Batson, moved the trial court to require a racially neutral
explanation. The court quickly denied the motion, "the Government not being involved in
this case." Id. Plaintiff appealed on this and other grounds. The Court of Appeals rejected
Polk's Batson claim in one paragraph, citing Edmonton II as dispositive. Id.
3" Edmonson II, 895 F.2d at 226.
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implicate the Constitution and is therefore, by definition, immune
from court review." 2
IV. PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES ARE STATE ACTION
In light of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals' decision to rehear
the Edmonson case, and the ensuing reversal, a close analysis of the
panel's holding and reasoning becomes useful to determine why it
failed to withstand re-examination. The Edmonson case is important
because it would have represented the significant next step in the
progression of two lines of cases." 3 Because the Edmonson I holding
was, in a sense, the furthest possible extension of the Batson rule,
the outcome of the rehearing was bound to attract the attention of
the Supreme Court, which had left it to the lower courts to imple-
ment the Batson holding and define its contours. 334 Indeed, on the
first day of the October 1990 term, the Court granted Edmonson's
petition for certiorari." 5
Edmonson I could be characterized as potentially the furthest
possible extension of the Batson rule because of the significant state
action issues it presented. Therefore, it must also be examined in
light of the Supreme Court holdings on state action in private
discrimination, as well as the state action discussions in Fludd v.
Dykes, Clark v. City of Bridgeport, and even, to a lesser extent, Maloney
v. Wo.shington." 6 Specific application of these precedents to the Ed-
monson case will yield a better sense of the strengths and weaknesses
3" Id. at 222-23. Note that the court did not consider the common situation in which
the government is a civil litigant, id. at 222 n.10, which was the case in all the previous civil
peremptory challenge suits. See supra note 7.
]" In a related development, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has recently held that
peremptory challenges based on gender violate the fifth amendment due process clause,
whether exercised by the prosecution or defense in a federal criminal trial. United States v.
DeGross, 59 U.S.L.W. 2204, 2204 (9th Cir. Sept. 10, 1990). In that trial for immigration law
violations, the prosecution attempted to strike all female jurors, the defense only males. The
trial court required gender-neutral explanations for the strikes and disallowed one such
challenge. The Court of Appeals upheld the district courts actions, citing Batson and relying
heavily on its arguments. Id. The DeGross court then extended Batson to challenges made by
the defense, reasoning that the constitutional harm was the same no matter which side
misused the peremptories. Id. The defense's strikes were state action because defendant was
exercising a state-created privilege in the course of a state proceeding, with the help of
government officials, and they were validated by a judge. Id. Accord, New York v. Irizarri, 59
U.S.L.W. 2204 (N.Y. App. Div. Sept. 18, 1990).
334 Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 99 n.24 (1986).
333 Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., Ill S. Ct. 41 (Oct. 1, 1990) (No. 89-7743)
(grant of certiorari and leave to proceed in forma pauperis).
"6 See supra notes 172-80 and accompanying text for a summary of the state action
discussions in those cases.
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of both of the decisions of the Fifth Circuit CoUrt of Appeals in
that case, and will, moreover, provide guidance regarding the trend
in the law of private discrimination.
The Edmonson I court did not provide a very detailed or thor-
ough rationale for extending Batson to the civil arena. Its review of
the case law on peremptory challenges was only cursory, and in fact
only recited, without discussion, the results in Wilson, Esposito and
Clark, largely ignoring Maloney."' The Edmonson I court, however,
may not have found the question of extending Batson very difficult.
The Batson Court itself presaged the outcome by basing its holding
solely on the fourteenth amendment rather than on the sixth
amendments" The sixth amendment, by its terms, is limited to the
rights of criminal defendants; the fourteenth amendment guaran-
tees to all citizens equal protection and due process of law in all
their dealings with government."9
Prior to Edmonson I, four federal cases dealt with the application
of Batson to civil trials. 340
 The respective weight of these decisions
can be debated. A relevant distinction is that while the two cases
supporting the extension of Batson were district court cases, the
more influential courts of appeals had fairly consistently gone the
other way: 341
 the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals decided Wilson, 342
555
 See supra note 253 on the Edmonson I court's treatment of those cases; Edmonson I,
860 F.2d at 1314 & n.31. The Edmonson I court could not rely much on Maloney for the
obvious reason that that decision had been vacated in Maloney II (Maloney v. Plunkett, 854
F.2d 152 (7th Cir. 1988)). See supra notes 154-62 and accompanying text for a discussion of
Maloney II.
358
 Batson, 476 U.S. at 84 n.4. But see id. at 112 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
559
 The sixth amendment reads, in pertinent part: "In all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the state
and district wherein the crime shall have been committed . ." U.S. CoNsr, amend. VI.
549
 See supra note 7 and accompanying text for a list of the cases decided prior to
Edmonson. Note that Fludd v. Dykes, 863 F.2d 822 (11th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct.
201 (1989) and Reynolds v. City of Little Rock, 893 F.2d 1004 (8th Cir. 1990), had not yet
been decided. See supra note 245 and accompanying text on the chronology of the Fludd and
Edmonson decisions. See supra note 321 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Reynolds
case.
341
 As mentioned above, two circuits have since decided in favor of extending Batson:
Reynolds v. City of Little Rock, 893 F.2d 1004 (8th Cir. 1990) and Fludd v. Dykes, 863 F.2d
822 (11th Cir. 1989). See supra notes 165-76 for a discussion of Fludd. See supra note 321
and accompanying text for a discussion of Reynolds. The dissent in Edmonson II noted that
two other circuits, in unpublished decisions, had declined to address the issue. Edmonson II,
895 F.2d at 235, n.92. (Rubin, J., dissenting). Those cases are: Nowlin v. General Tel, Co.,
892 F.2d 1041 (4th Cir. 1989); Robinson v. Quick, 875 F.2d 867 (6th Cir. 1989), cert, denied,
110 S. Ct. 149 (1990); and Boykin v. Hamilton County Bd. of Educ., 869 F.2d 1488 (6th Cir.
1989). The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals has since reiterated its position, in Polk v. Dixie
Ins. Co., 897 F.2d 1346, 1347 (5th Cir. 1990); see supra note 330 for a discussion of Polk.
3" See supra notes 131-38 and accompanying text for a discussion of Wilson.
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a Second Circuit judge wrote Esposito, 343 and the Seventh Circuit
Court of Appeals vacated the Maloney ruling.'"
Maloney II, however, expressly declined to state any view on the
merits of extending Batson and held only that the trial judge could
not take away the litigants' statutory right to peremptory chal-
lenges. 345 Esposito and Wilson were both short opinions which sum-
marily dismissed Batson-based claims. 346 Esposito squarely held that
the Batson reasoning was limited to the criminal context; 347 the
Wilson court only expressed in dicta its strong doubts about the civil
application of Batson.348 A factor in both the Esposito and Wilson
cases, however, was the weakness of both claims on the facts—both
plaintiffs, because they were white, were unable to establish the
prima facie case set out in Batson,349 which required the claimant to
prove he was a member of the same cognizable racial group as the
excluded jurors. 55°
To support its decision to extend the Batson rule, the Edmonson
I court was able to look to Clark and, to a much lesser extent,
Maloney, both remarkably bold rulings. Clark was the first decision
to expand the Batson rule to civil cases, and it did so despite the
fact that one of the claimants was white. 351 The Clark court justified
that action by citing the rights of the excluded jurors, who had
themselves made no complaint. 352 Maloney, in some ways, went even
further—apparently too far, according to the Seventh Circuit Court
of Appeals. 353
3" See supra note 112 on the authorship of Esposito.
s" Maloney v. Plunkett ("Maloney II"), 854 F.2d 152,156 (7th Cir. 1988). See supra notes
154-62 and accompanying text for a discussion of Maloney 11.
3" See supra notes 161-62 and accompanying text for a discussion of the limits of the
Maloney II holding.
346 Esposito v. Buonome, 642 F. Supp. 760 (D. Conn. 1986), was only three pages long.
See supra notes 112-18 and accompanying text for a discussion of Esposito. The opinion in
Wilson v. Cross, 845 F.2d 163 (8th Cir. 1988), was also only three pages long. See supra notes
131-38 and accompanying text for a discussion of Wilson.
347 Esposito, 642 F. Supp. at 761.
348 See supra note 137 and accompanying text on the limits of the Wilson decision.
349 Esposito, 642 F. Supp. at 761; Wilson, 845 F.2d at 165. See supra notes 118 and 138
and accompanying text with regard to the race of the plaintiffs in these cases.
"° Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79,96 (1986).
351 See supra notes 125-26 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Clark court's
treatment of the white plaintiff.
3" See supra notes 127-28 and accompanying text on the Clark court's protection of the
jurors' rights over those of the litigant.
sss Maloney v. Plunkett ("Maloney II"), 854 F.2d 152,154 (7th Cir. 1988). See supra notes
154-62 and accompanying text for a discussion of Maloney II.
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Nonetheless, the Edmonson court could still look to the forceful
substantive arguments advanced by the Maloney court for guidance,
if not for precedent. In Maloney, the trial court, on its own motion,
had imposed the Batson rule on both sides of a civil trial, including
the private party plaintiff, ruling that equal protection limited per-
emptories by civil litigants whether they were public officials or
not. 354
 The Maloney court dispensed with the need for a party to
establish a prima facie case of discrimination and required both
sides to justify their racial peremptories, finally denying the parties
the right to use any peremptory challenges at all. 555 Obviously, the
Edmonson I court could not have taken such bold steps, but it did
cite the Maloney case in support of the fundamental principle that
bigotry has no place in a federal courtroom regardless of the crim-
inal or civil nature of the tria1. 356
Clark and Maloney both were forceful, active opinions, when
compared to Esposito's brief treatment of the issue, 357 and to Wilson
and Maloney II, both of which expressed no opinion on the merits. 358
Thus, the Edmonson I court did not really break much new ground
with its holding, but the decision is still significant because it was
the first case in which the issues of racial peremptories by purely
private litigants were squarely presented. It was also the first time
a federal court of appeals held that Batson could be applied to civil
trials. 359 The Edmonson court had a stronger factual basis for its
holding that private parties may not use peremptory challenges to
exclude blacks from a jury than did Maloney and, later, Fiudd. 3"
Such statements in Maloney are of doubtful reliability in light of
Maloney II, and in Fludd they can only have the force of dicta at
best, because it was unnecessary for the court to reach that question
in that case. 3°'
3" Maloney v. Washington, 690 F. Supp. 687, 689 (N.D. III. 1988), irritated sub nom.
Maloney v. Plunkett ("Maloney In, 854 F.2d 152 (7th Cir. 1988).
"5 Maloney, 690 F, Supp. at 688, 692.	 .
356 Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co. ("Edmonson 1"), 860 F.2d 1308, 1314 n.31 (5th
Cir. 1988), rev'd, 895 F.2d 218, 219 (5th Cir. 1990) ("Edmonson II"), cert. granted, Ill S. Ct.
41 (Oct. 1, 1990) (No. 89-7743).
35' See supra note 346 and accompanying text on the brevity of the Esposito opinion.
• 359 See Wilson v. Cross, 845 F.2d 163, 165 (8th Cir. 1988) and Maloney v. Plunkett
("Maloney 11"), 854 F.2d 152, 155 (7th Cir. 1988).
"9 Fludd and Reynolds had yet to be decided at that time; see supra notes 340-41 and
accompanying text.
369 The defendants in both of those cases were governmental officials, not private parties.
361 The Fludd decision nevertheless provides significant appellate level support for the
civil application of Batson to private parties (although not significant enough to persuade the
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals). In addition to stating that peremptories by either the state
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In Edmonson I, the court reviewed a broad collection of Su-
preme Court state action cases, but missed a significant opportunity
to strengthen its holding by neglecting to analyze and apply those
cases more closely to the facts before it. Instead, the court did little
more than assert that a judge cannot allow racial discrimination in
a court of law. 362
 The court did not provide sufficient specific case
law to support its holdings that state action was present and that
the trial judge was the state actor. 565 The court's conclusory state-
ment weakens the decision because the importance of satisfying this
threshold requirement cannot be underestimated; only by proving
sufficient state action can the fourteenth amendment be implicated,
and only then can Batson be considered. Had the Edmonson I court
applied the language of each of the various state action cases it
discussed to the facts before it, the outcome of the case would not
have changed, but the court's opinion would have been much less
vulnerable to attack upon rehearing. 364
or a private party were subject to equal protection, the Fludd court provided more detailed
reasoning on the question of state action. Drawing from Strauder and other early jury
discrimination cases, the Fludd court held that state action arose in the role of the trial judge
in supervising jury selection. See supra notes 163-76 and accompanying text for a discussion
of Fludd.
The Reynolds decision is also helpful for its statement that the differences between
criminal and civil trials are irrelevant to the fourteenth amendment. Its value is limited,
however, inasmuch as the court there expressly declined to address the question of peremp-
tory challenges exercised by private parties. See supra note 321 and accompanying text for a
discussion of Reynolds.
562 Edmonson 1, 860 F.2d at 1312-13.
MI5 See id. at 1312-13, 1312 n.23, 1313 n.24. There are only two citations in this portion
of the court's opinion: one to a New York state case, People v. Gary M., 138 Misc.2d 1081,
526 N.Y.S.2d 986 (1988), and one to Tocqueville's DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA.
364 For a critique of the conclusions and state action analysis in Edmonson 1 as well as
Fludd v. Dykes, see Note, supra note 176, at 185, in which the author argues that govern-
mental "causation, encouragement, or specific authorization" is necessary to create state action
covered by the fourteenth amendment. The author analogizes the private attorney to a
corporation in a highly regulated business, which the Supreme Court has never held to be,
per se, a state actor. Id. at 187 (citing Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974)).
Governmental action here, the Note argues, is only passive toleration and mere acquiescence,
whereas actual official participation in the decision to discriminate is necessary to establish
state action. Id. at 187, 189, 192.
The author places too much emphasis, however, on cause. The Supreme Court has held
that the government may not, by legislative or judicial action, give effect to private prejudices.
See, e.g., Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 431, 433 (1984) (see supra note 252 and accom-
panying text on the Edmonson 1 court's reliance on Palmore); Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S.
369, 378-79, (1967) (see supra notes 201-06 and accompanying text for a discussion of
Reitman); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 20 (1948) (see supra notes 183-92 and accompanying
text for a discussion of Shelley). Further, by repeatedly analogizing the peremptory challenge
issue to commercial disputes involving property rights, the Note overlooks the fact that the
Edmonson case involves fundamental civil rights and issues of racial discrimination, which
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First, Shelley v. Kraemer would have significantly bolstered the
Edmonson I holding, because it held state action to exist in court
enforcement of private discrimination. 365 Shelley provided the Ed-
monson I panel with a simple but fairly potent argument. Shelley held
that actions of courts and court officers are "state actions" for the
purposes of the fourteenth amendment, and that such actions can-
not be used to advance or enforce racial discrimination. 366 The
Edmonson I court eloquently argued that the court's administration
of peremptory challenges constitutes "action" and that such action
bore the sanction of the government. 367
 It made the obvious con-
nection to show that the trial court, by excusing the challenged
jurors and empanelling those selected, gave effect to private dis-
crimination by the litigant who exercised the racially motivated
challenge. 3.68
 Still, the court failed to support these arguments by
specifically citing the case in which they originated. 369
Even if the Edmonson I court were to fail in its efforts to establish
that a court's role in presiding over jury selection is a sufficiently
active one, it could have relied on Burton v. Wilmington Parking
Authority for the proposition that the government may not acquiesce
in private discrimination in which it is even indirectly involved.3"
Burton declared that the state has a positive responsibility to ensure
that, in its dealings with private parties, those parties must adhere
to the Constitution.37 ' This responsibility is particularly grave in the
context of judicial proceedings, in contrast to commercial leases, 372
require heightened judicial scrutiny and increased vigilance against violations. See, e.g., Strau-
der v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 307-09 (1880) (see supra notes 48-61 and accompanying
text for a discussion of Strautler); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944)
(courts must employ strict scrutiny when examining classifications based on race).
365 Shelley, 334 U.S. at 20. See supra notes 183-92 and accompanying text for a discussion
of Shelley.
3" Id.
3" Edmonson I, 860 F.2d at 1312-13.
356 Id. The court left implicit in its argument the assumption that the race-based chal-
lenges were invidious discrimination of the sort the fourteenth amendment was meant to
stop. See id, The dissent, however, argued that there was little or no racism involved. Id. at
1316 (Gee, J., dissenting). CI supra note 108, for a discussion of King v. County of Nassau,
581 F. Supp. 493, 502-03 (E.D.N.Y. 1984) (holding that the harm was beyond the scope of
the fourteenth amendment protections).
'" This is perhaps a reflection of the courts' apparent reluctance to rely on Shelley as
precedent. See, e.g., supra note 204 for a discussion of the Reitman court's avoidance of Shelley
as precedent.
"° See supra notes 197-200 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Burton holding.
" 1
 Burton v. Wilmington Parking Audi., 365 U.S. 715, 726 (1961).
"2 See, e.g„ supra note 152 and accompanying text on the gravity with which the Maloney
court treated the judicial setting.
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because the courts are the single institution of government charged
with enforcing the basic civil rights of citizens and dedicated, by
definition, to justice, both in process and in result. A court's passive
acceptance of racially based peremptories is clearly a more serious
abdication of that responsibility than the Wilmington Parking Au-
thority's contract with a segregationist restaurant operator. 373
 Thus,
the Edmonson I court could have relied on the Burton affirmative
responsibility argument alone to justify the extension of Batson to
all trials.
The Edmonson 1 panel's characterization of the court's partici-
pation in peremptory challenges certainly satisfies the "significant
involvement" test enunciated in Reitman v. Mulkey374 and Moose Lodge
No. 107 v. Irvis. 375 Statutory authorization, judicial administration,
and a state forum for the exercise of peremptory challenges clearly
constitute significant state involvement in the procedure. 376 In Moose
Lodge, the state's issuance of a liquor license to a club which excluded
blacks did not involve the state in the lodge's segregationist policies.
It only gave the lodge the right to sell alcohol, not the right or
opportunity to discriminate The peremptory challenge proce-
dure, however, by definition fosters and encourages discrimination,
which Moose Lodge held impermissible. 378 The law challenged in
Reitman v. Mulkey would have authorized private discrimination in
housing as a matter of state constitutional right. 379 Like the property
owners in Reitman, litigants have been authorized by the peremptory
challenge law to use their absolute discretion to discriminate against
whomever they wish. 38° Moreover, the discrimination in the Edmon-
son case touches the justice system, where it is least tolerable. 88 '
"3 See supra notes 193-200 and accompanying text for a discussion of Burton. The state
action analysis in Fludd seems to run along the same lines: "'[T]he refusal of the State court
to redress the wrong ... was a denial of a right secured ... by the Constitution and laws of
the United States.'" Fludd v. Dykes, 863 F.2d 822, 828 (11th Cir. 1989) (quoting Ex Parte
Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 347 (1879)).
"4 387 U.S. 369 (1967); see supra notes 201-06 and accompanying text for a discussion
of Reitman.
"8 407 U.S. 163 (1972); see supra notes 207-18 and accompanying text for a discussion
of Moose Lodge.
"fi See Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co. ("Edmonson	 860 F.2d 1308, 1312-13 (5th
Cir. 1988), reu'd, 895 F.2d 218, 219 (5th Cir. 1990) ("Edmonton II"), cert. granted, 111 S. Ct.
41 (Oct. 1, 1990) (No. 89-7743).
See supra notes 209-18 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Moose Lodge
holding.
"8 Moose Lodge, 407 U.S. at 176-79.
39 See supra note 206 and accompanying text on the legal effect of the California
amendment invalidated in Reitman.
5" See Edmonson II, 895 F.2d at 230 (Rubin, J., dissenting).
881 See, e.g., Maloney v. Washington, 690 F. Supp. 687, 690 (N.D. III. 1988).
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Having concluded that the court provided significant assistance
to litigants in their efforts to discriminate,382 the Edmonson I court
could have made better use of the holding in Tulsa Professional
Collection Services v. Pope. 383 Tulsa is similar to the Edmonson case
because, as a probate proceeding, it also involves court oversight
and administration of a legal procedure driven mainly by private
parties. 384 Tulsa held that a private party could not use state probate
procedures, and the aid of state officials, to deny a property claim
without due process. 385 The Tulsa rule, then, would require the
court to determine whether judicial administration of jury selection
is overt, substantial assistance of state officials to private parties
making use of state procedures. Peremptory challenges have no
effect until the judge excuses the challenged jurors and empanels
the selected jurors. 388
 Further, jury commissioners compile the lists
of people who comprise the venires from which litigants choose
their juries.387
 Court clerks assist in the administration of the pro-
cess. 388 As the Edmonson I opinion stated, the government is not
merely an observer, but a significant participant in the discrimina-
tion; the only thing the government does not do is make the actual
decision to discriminate. 389
The Edmonson I court never explicitly applied the two-part test
of state action from Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co.,39° the test which
would ultimately prove decisive on rehearing."' Lugar provides the
clearest and perhaps most difficult test of state action: first, the
violation must arise from the exercise of a state-created privilege;
and second, the party charged with the violation must be fairly
characterized as a state actor. 342
 In both his Edmonson opinions,
Judge Gee asserted that civil peremptories did not meet the Lugar
Edmonson 1, 860 F.2d at 1312-13.
5" 485 U.S. 478 (1988).
554
 See supra notes 230-36 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Tulsa case.
"5 Tulsa, 485 U.S. at 486-87.
5" Edmonson I, 860 F.2d at 1312.
"7
 See, e.g., Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202,206-07 (1965).
"" Edmonson II, 895 F.2d at 232 (Rubin, J., dissenting).
"9 Edmonson 1, 860 F.2d at 1312 (quoting People v. Gary M., 138 Misc. 2d 1081,1089,
526 N.Y.S.2d 986,994 (1988)).
390
 457 U.S, 922 (1982). See supra notes 219-29 and accompanying text for a discussion
of the Lugar case. The Edmonsan./ court recited the terms of the Lugar test but did not apply
them specifically. Edmonson 1, 860 F.2d at 1311,1312.
391 Judge Gee relied on the Lugar test as dispositive both in his dissent in Edmonson I,
860 F.2d at 1315-16, and in his opinion for the en bane court in Edmonson II, 895 F.2d at
221-22.
592 See supra notes 223-26 and accompanying text for a discussion of the two parts of
the Lugar test.
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requirements. 393 The Maloney court, however, cited Lugar in support
of its activist ruling. 394
 Even Judge Gee conceded that the first prong
of the test is easily satisfied: the exercise of peremptory strikes in a
civil trial is certainly a privilege derived from state authority. 395 The
second prong, whether the actor may fairly be called a state actor,
is the more difficult hurdle. The Lugar court listed three factors to
be considered in making this determination: whether the actor is a
government official; whether the actor had worked together with
or had obtained significant aid from government officials; or
whether the conduct is otherwise attributable to the state. 396
As applied by Judge Gee in his Edmonson I dissent, the Lugar
test would seem to require that some private party be found to be
a state actor. 397 This is not necessary, however, in cases where there
is actual significant state participation in the challenged action.
Nevertheless, applying the test to a private litigant can still yield a
positive result. The private litigant who excludes jurors on the basis
of race is plainly covered by the second category of state actor
delineated in Lugar—the private party acting with significant aid
from the state. The attorneys act pursuant to federal statute. As
members of the bar, they are considered officers of the court. In
conducting jury selection, they use procedures and facilities pro-
vided by the government. Finally, the judge officiates over and
validates the entire process. 398 This kind of official assistance easily
makes the attorney a state actor, just as it did the ex parte claimant
in Lugar, 399 thus satisfying the second part of the Lugar test and
subjecting his or her actions to the fourteenth amendment.
Beyond the direct application of the criteria in these cases, the
court in Edmonson I could also have made an argument applying
Reitman by analogy. Just as in Reitman, where the California amend-
393 Edmonson !, 860 F.2d at 1315 (Gee, J., dissenting); see also Edmonson II, 895 F.2d at
221-22.
]94 Maloney v. Washington, 690 F. Supp, 687, 690 (N.D. Ill. 1988), vacated sub nom.
Maloney v. Plunkett, 854 F.2d 152 (7th Cir. 1988). See supra note 151 and accompanying
text on the Maloney court's use of Lugar.
3" Edmonson I, 860 F.2d at 1315 (Gee, J., dissenting); see also Edmonson II, 895 F.2d at
221
396 Lugar, 457 U.S. 922, 937 (1982). See supra notes 219-29 and accompanying text for
a discussion of the Lugar decision.
'°' See Edmonson I, 860 F.2d at 1315-16 (Gee, J., dissenting). Judge Gee summarily
dismissed the possibility of the trial judge being the state actor, saying his function is "merely
ministerial." Id. at 1316.
398 For further discussion of the concept of a litigant's attorney as state actor, being a
private party performing a public function, see Note, supra note 35, at 949-57.
3" Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 941-42 (1982).
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meet, through neutral language, acted to authorize or permit pri-
vate discrimination, Edmonson also involves a facially neutral law
which all too often serves to permit invidious racial discrimination.
As the Batson court stated, peremptory challenges permit "those to
discriminate who are of a mind to discriminate."400 The Reitman
analogy, however, would only be valid if the claimant, like those in
Reitman, were making a facial challenge to the constitutionality of
the entire peremptory challenge practice and the statute which
authorizes them. This argument, however, would call for the much
more far-reaching result of eliminating peremptories entirely. 401
This is, of course, a highly unlikely development; the peremptory
challenge remains a venerable institution in trial practice.'"
Judge Gee's dissent in Edmonson I basically raised two issues:
application of the Lugar test and the logical inconsistency of requir-
ing explanations for peremptory challenges. 403 He would make
these same arguments again, successfully, in his opinion for the en
banc court in Edmonson //. 4°4 Expanding on the position he took in
dissent, Judge Gee stated in Edmonson II that the judge could not
be a state actor because the court's function was merely administra-
tive,405 and that private attorneys could not be state actors because
they serve their clients' private partisan interests, not the state's. 406
Judge Gee raises some strong arguments. He points out the
inconsistency in identifying the court as a state actor in the per-
emptory challenge process when, by definition, the challenges are
4°0 Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79,96 (1986) (quoting Avery v. Georgia, 345 U.S. 559,
562 (1953)).
4" The Court has considered this step. Justice Marshall, concurring in Batson, wrote:
"The decision today will not end the racial discrimination that peremptories inject into the
jury-selection process. That goal can be accomplished only by eliminating peremptory chal-
lenges entirely." 476 U.S. at 102-103 (Marshall, J., concurring).
402 See, e.g., Batson, 476 U.S. at 118-22 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). The possible demise
of the peremptory challenge, Judge Gee wrote in his Edmonton I dissent, may be the ultimate
result of the Batson rule. Edmonson I, 860 F.2d at 1317 (Gee, J., dissenting); see also Edmonson
II, 895 F.2d at 221 n.6. Judge Gee argued that the hybrid challenge created by Batson and
Edmonson I, for which some cause must be given sometimes, is logically and practically flawed
and cannot long survive. Id. For a discussion of the issue which shares both Judge Gee's
dissatisfaction with the procedural and logical problems created by Batson, as well as Justice
Marshall's conviction that peremptories are ultimately incompatible with the fourteenth
amendment, see Alschuler, supra note 26, at 166.
402 Edmonson I, 860 F.2d at 1315,1316-17 (Gee, J., dissenting). See supra notes 258-65
and accompanying text for a discussion of Judge Gee's dissent in Edmonton I.
4" Edmonson II, 895 F.2d at 211-22,226.
409
	 at 221-22.
4" Id. at 222.
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not subject to the court's contro1. 4°7 Further, reasoning that the
effect of the extension of Batson would be to "constitutionalize"
every minor procedural decision a judge makes, he states that such
a step was one better taken by the Supreme Court, not a court of
appeals. 408
 He further supports his holding that a private attorney
cannot be a state actor by citing Polk County v. Dodson, which held
that a public defender, although paid by the state, is not a state
actor for section 1983 purposes.'"
But the court's analysis in Edmonson II is fraught with a variety
of weaknesses which may leave it open to challenge before the
Supreme Court. To begin with, the divide-and-conquer treatment
of the Lugar question, looking first at the judge, then the attorney,
fails to consider the three factors suggested in Lugar for deciding
that question.41 ° In particular, Judge Gee ignores the second fac-
tor—action by a private party together with, or with substantial
assistance from, the state—which specifically contemplates that com-
bined public/private action may have constitutional significance. 4 "
Perhaps neither the judge412 nor the attorney by themselves may
violate the fourteenth amendment, but certainly together they act
to bar citizens from jury service solely because of their race, which
the Supreme Court, since Strauder, has said they may not do.
Judge Gee devoted the bulk of his opinion to the history and
policy of peremptory challenges, and it is in these areas that his
argument is most deficient. He relies heavily on the Swain decision
throughout his opinion. 413
 This reliance is premised on an overly
broad reading of that case, and an extremely narrow interpretation
of Batson. Judge Gee lists as a major conclusion of the Swain decision
407 Id. at 221.
408 Id. at 222.
409 Edmcinsart 11, 895 F.2d at 222 (citing Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 325
(1981)).
410
 Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 937 (1982).
411 See supra notes 398-99 and accompanying text on the application of this factor of
the Lugar test.
412
 Judge Rubin's argument that the court's role in and of itself is significant and active
enough to constitute state action seems more persuasive. See Edmonson I, 860 F.2d at 1312-
13; see also Edmonson II, 895 F.2d at 229-30 (Rubin, j., dissenting). The majority's "merely
ministerial" argument begs the question why administrative state action is less state action
than policy-oriented state action. See supra notes 365-99 for a discussion of how court
administration of the jury selection process constitutes state action.
418 See, e.g., Edmonson II, 895 F.2d at 224, where the court declared: "[W]e do not believe
that the considerations underlying Swain or the reasoning upon which it rests support such
a proposition as this [that civil litigants may be called upon to explain their peremptory
challenges]."
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that the fourteenth amendment can provide relief when peremp-
tories are used generally to disqualify blacks, but he does not give
a citation to Swain supporting that proposition. 414
 This is simply
because Swain contained no such holding; at most, Justice White
stated in the Swain opinion that the fourteenth amendment "takes
on added significance" in cases of systematic discrimination. 415
 The
Edmonson 11 court's repeated characterizations of Swain as based on
a principle that discriminatory peremptories violate the fourteenth
amendment rights of defendants and jurors, 416
 are at best dubious
when the Swain court showed so little solicitude to the defendant's
equal protection claim. 4 ' 7
Further, according to the Edmonson 11 majority, the Batson de-
cision merely reaffirmed Swain., departing from that holding only
to the extent that it revised the evidentiary burden placed on claim-
ants.415
 Such a reading ignores the spirit of the Batson opinion 419
and is belied by the statement of Justice White, author of Swain,
concurring in Batson: "The Court overturns the principal holding
in Swain v. Alabama . . . ."420
 As the dissent pointed out, Judge Gee's
reliance on Polk County v. Dodson is also misplaced. 42 ' That case had
nothing to do with private discrimination or state action under the
fourteenth amendment; rather, it addressed whether the actions of
a public defender in representing her client were under color of
law for purposes of determining her liability for malpractice under
section 1983.422
414 See id. at 220.
4 '' Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 223 (1965). Hui see Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S.
79, 98 (1986).
416
 Edmonson II, 895 F.2d at 220, 223-24.
417 The Swain Court denied a claim of systematic discrimination despite a showing that
not a single Black had served on any jury in the county for at least fifteen years. See supra
notes 79-81 fir a discussion of this aspect of the Swain decision.
41 ' Edmonson II, 895 F.2d at 220-23,
419
 Baum, 476 U.S. at 99. The Court stated:
The reality of practice, amply reflected in many state- and federal-court opin-
ions, shows that the challenge may be, and unfortunately at times has been,
used to discriminate against black jurors. By requiring trial courts to be sensitive
to the racially discriminatory use of peremptory challenges, our decision en-
forces the mandate of equal protection and furthers the ends of justice. In view
of the heterogeneous population of our Nation, public respect for our criminal
justice system and the rule of law will be strengthened if we ensure that no
citizen is disqualified from jury service because of his race.
Id.
42D Id. at 100 (White, J., concurring).
421 Edmonson II, 895 F.2d at 231 (Rubin, J., dissenting).
424 Id.
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In addition to an inaccurate reading of the case law, the Ed-
monson II court's reasoning is also problematic. Judge Gee states
that striking a juror out of fear that the juror may tend to favor a
member of the same race is permissible because it is not demeaning
to the juror. 425 But to exclude a juror out of suspicion that the juror,
because of race, will be unable impartially to decide a case clearly
demeans that juror's abilities,424 and was expressly forbidden in
Batson. 425
Later, in his state action analysis, Judge Gee reasons that the
judge cannot be responsible for any discrimination because all he
or she does is "stand aside" while the private attorney discriminates,
and therefore the fault, if any, must lie with the system which allows
such challenges. 426 In addition to raising the question why a judge
sworn to uphold the Constitution should stand aside to permit
private discrimination, the statement lays bare the fact that unfet-
tered peremptory challenges are inherently discriminatory 427 and
ultimately cannot co-exist with the equal protection clause. 428
Finally, Judge Gee places significant reliance on the long history
of the challenge, 429 and states that the ultimate fairness of the
428 Id. at 219, 221 n.6, 224.
424 See, e.g., Batson, 476 U.S. at 138 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting), in which Justice Rehnquist
admitted: "Such use of peremptories is at best based upon seat-of-the-pants instincts, which
are undoubtedly crudely stereotypical and may in many cases be hopelessly mistaken."
428 Id. at 89. The Edmonson II court gives three hypothetical examples of peremptory
challenges exercised against Blacks which are not racially demeaning. 895 F.2d at 224. The
first is a striking black airline pilot in an unrelated suit against another airline. This example
is inapposite because the strike would not be based on race, but on commercial affiliations.
The second is a black juror in a contract action against a known Ku Klux Klansman. But
this example is also imperfect because this juror may well be excused for cause because of
the very real possibility of bias. In any event, these two strikes are admittedly not racially
degrading. The third example, however, is the situation in the instant case: striking a black
juror out of fear that he or she may favor one's opponent because of race. Judge Gee states
conclusorily that it is "very plain indeed" that this strike is also innocuous. But while the first
two strikes are based on realistic possibilities of bias not necessarily related to race, the third
is based solely on the belief that the black juror is incapable of impartially considering a case
made against a member of his own race. This race-based attribution, which white lawyers
almost never make about white jurors, unquestionably demeans the judgment and integrity
of the black juror.
426 Edmonson 11, 895 F.2d at 222, 226.
427 In frequently quoted language, the Batson Court declared, "there can be no dispute,
that peremptory challenges constitute a jury selection practice that permits 'those to discrim-
inate who are of a mind to discriminate." 476 U.S. at 96 (quoting Avery v. Georgia, 345 U.S.
559, 562 (1953)).
4R8 See id. at 102-08 (Marshall, J., concurring).
129 Edmonson II, 895 F.2d at 223. Judge Gee states that "at all events, a procedural device
of such great age and broad acceptance as the civil peremptory challenge should require •
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challenge comes from the fact that all jurors are subject to it. 4" But
such arguments, essentially justifying the practice because everyone
has always done it, and that it works both ways, cannot sustain a
practice shown to violate fundamental civil rights. 4" Peremptory
challenges are at most a common law and statutory right, 432 and
such rights must bow to constitutional rights.
Judge Rubin, dissenting in Edmonson II, wrote the opinion he
should have initially written, convincingly responding to each of the
arguments raised by the majority. The dissent effectively refutes
the minor arguments based on history, utility and procedural con-
venience, mainly because such factors can be of little consequence
when balanced against basic civil rights. 433
 More importantly, Judge
Rubin advances a strong state action analysis, discussing in detail
how the trial court's administration of peremptory challenges sat-
isfies the Lugar test, and applying with greater specificity other state
action cases, namely Burton and Reitman.434 Judge Rubin further
points out how the majority misinterprets Swain, Batson and Polk
County. 435
 He is able this time around to cite federal appellate level
support for the extension of Batson to civil cases. 436
The greatest strength of Judge Rubin's opinion, however, is its
foundation in the language and spirit of the fourteenth amend-
ment. His arguments are inspired by his conviction that the equal
protection clause simply cannot permit the exclusion of United
States citizens from jury service solely on the basis of their race. 4"
This consistency with the guiding principles of the Reconstruction
Amendments makes Judge Rubin's arguments substantially more
persuasive than the majority's drawing of fine distinctions regarding
little defense: clearly, for a long time, and in jurisdiction after jurisdiction, it has been found
to serve useful purposes." Id.
' 3° Id. at 226. Judge Gee here echoes the argument made by then Justice Rehnquist in
his dissent in Batson. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 137-38 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
45L Edmonson II, 895 F.2d at 237-38 (Rubin, J., dissenting).
' 52 See supra notes 19-34 for a discussion of the origins and history of the peremptory
challenge,
455 Id. al 227-28,237-38 (Rubin, J., dissenting).
454 Id. at 229-33 (Rubin, J., dissenting). This is in contrast to his rather conclusory
statements in Edmonson I, See supra notes 254 and 362-64 and accompanying text for a
discussion of the Edmonson I court's handling of the state action cases.
455
 Edmonson II, 895 F.2d at 231,233-35 (Rubin, J., dissenting). See supra notes 404-22
for an analysis of the majority's reading of those cases.
455 Edmonson II, 895 F.2d at 235 (Rubin, J., dissenting). Judge Rubin did not have the
benefit of the Fludd and Reynolds decisions when writing his opinion in Edmonton 1,
497 See, e.g., Edmonson II, 895 F.2d at 235,238 (Rubin, J., dissenting).
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evidentiary burdens, the role of the civil jury and the ministerial
function of the civil judge.
The Edmonson decisions by themselves demonstrate the sharp
division in the federal judiciary over the extension of Batson to civil
trials. The recent decisions in Fludd v. Dykes and Reynolds v. City of
Little Rock now create a direct conflict in the circuits, 438 which the
Supreme Court will now address when it hears the Edmonson case"
In Clark, Fludd and Reynolds, the lower federal courts have taken
the Supreme Court's lead in Batson and extended equal protection
against racism in jury selection almost as far as possible without
eliminating peremptories entirely. In all events, the principle of
Batson that peremptory challenges are subject to the restrictions of
the fourteenth amendment is already so firmly established, there
would appear to be little room for turning back.
V. CONCLUSION
•
The ultimate fate of peremptory challenges notwithstanding,
an examination of the case law from Strauder to the Edmonson de-
cisions, informed not only by a commitment to racial equality but
also by a sense of the importance of preserving the legitimacy of
the nation's judicial system, leads to the conclusion that peremptory
challenges cannot be used to discriminate on racial or ethnic
grounds in a criminal or civil tria1. 44° Edmonson II notwithstanding,
"B To summarize the conflict in the circuits, the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
Circuit has held in favor of extending Batson to civil trials. Fludd v. Dykes, 863 F.2d 822,
823 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 201 (1989). The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals has
now held against the extension of Batson. Polk v. Dixie Ins. Co., 897 F.2d 1346, 1347 (5th
Cir. 1990); Edmonson II, 895 F.2d at 219. Panels in the Eighth Circuit have reached opposite
conclusions: Reynolds v. City of Little Rock, 893 F.2d 1004, 1004 (8th Cir. 1990); Swapshire
v. Baer, 865 F.2d 948, 953-54 (8th Cir. 1989); Wilson v. Cross, 845 F.2d 163, 164 (8th Cir.
1988). The Courts of Appeals for the Fourth, Sixth and Seventh Circuits have expressly
declined to address the issue. See Nowlin v. General Tel. Co., 892 F.2d 1041 (4th Cir. 1989)
(unpublished opinion); Robinson v. Quick, 875 F.2d 867 (6th Cir. 1989) (unpublished opin-
ion), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 149 (1990); Boykin v. Hamilton County Bd. of Educ., 869 F.2d
1488 (6th Cir. 1989) (unpublished opinion); Maloney v. Plunkett ("Maloney II"), 854 F.2d 152
(7th Cir. 1988).
439 Although the Supreme Court's decision in Holland v. Illinois, 110 S. Ct. 803 (1990),
that the sixth amendment does not prohibit racially motivated peremptories may indicate
that the Court has grown less receptive to such claims since Batson, a majority of the Justices
apparently still support the Batson rule. Five members of the Batson majority are still on the
Court, and Justice Kennedy indicated the position had merit in his Holland concurrence. Id.
at 811 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Sec supra note 91 for a discussion of the Holland case and
the status of the Batson majority.
410 For a contrary conclusion, see Note, supra note 176, at 194-95. See supra note 364
for a further discussion of the arguments in that Note.
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the development of the case law has shown a fairly consistent broad-
ening of the fourteenth amendment protections guaranteed to
those involved in the judicial process, as well as a concomitant
narrowing of the ability of private actors legally to discriminate in
all areas—housing, public accommodations, jury selection. Thus,
when private parties enter the courthouse, they should do so with
the knowledge that the state cannot aid them in giving effect to
private biases in derogation of the other party's rights to equal
protection and due process. Because Edmonson II does not uphold
this principle, it cannot claim to be consistent with Strauder and its
progeny.
The importance of equal rights for all races cannot be disputed.
Another concern, however, is the need to preserve complete fairness
and justice in the nation's courts, in theory, in perception, and in
practice. This concern is equally compelling because it implicates
the nation's ability to ensure that equality. Even the slightest ap-
pearance of invidious discrimination in a court of law cannot be
permitted. To follow Edmonson 11 and tolerate such discrimination
would damage public confidence and faith in the judicial system
and the justice meted out by that system.
These concerns for equal rights and the ultimate fairness and
justice in our courts are the backbone of the equal protection and
due process clauses of the fourteenth amendment. The reasoning
and spirit behind the holdings protecting racial equality in jury
composition arise from these concerns. In Batson and its progeny
through Edmonson, the countervailing value to be outweighed was
the historic privilege of the peremptory challenge. The challenge
itself was originally designed to serve many of the same values. Yet,
equal protection and due process are constitutional values, whereas
peremptory challenges carry only the weight of statutes and com-
mon law. When these bodies of law come into conflict, the Consti-
tution must always prevail, and that in itself should be sufficient to
dispose of the question the peremptory challenge cases have posed.
In a court sworn to uphold equal protection of the laws, the very
idea of a peremptory challenge is suspect, but the court must at
least, as recognized in Batson and Edmonson I, guarantee that they
are exercised in a manner and with an effect which is completely
free of invidious discrimination.
ROBERT M. O'CONNELL
